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ABSTRACT 
Integrated Approach to Information Risk Assessment 
Ece Kaner 
The primary intent of this thesis is to contribute to information risk assessment process 
conducted in large organizations, by addressing important aspects within the process, its 
principles, the steps followed within a structured methodology. In this thesis, first, the 
existing methodologies, best practices, standards, and tools in information risk assessment 
are compiled and evaluated according to well-defined criteria. Besides this evaluation, an 
integrated information risk assessment methodology is developed that uses the high 
potential of the previous methodologies and addresses their identified deficiencies. The 
new methodology is validated with a case study. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivations 
In an increasingly uncertain world where people expect continuous quality service, 
information risk management is a necessity to ensure business resilience for all 
organizations. Those organizations that realize this need and decide to take proactive 
measures to ensure their information systems are capable of supporting continued 
operation of critical services, are capable of providing the legal and regulatory 
requirements of their operating environment, and meeting the expectations of their 
stakeholders. 
In addition to assessing information risks, it is essential to provide cost effective 
approaches, with practical solutions and timelines, to protect the information assets 
against the negative impacts of the risks. In this respect, information risk assessment is 
known as a good practice and is carried out by organizations, on a periodic basis. This 
requirement is further enforced with respect to the regulatory environment. 
Despite its necessity, extensive use and benefits, there is no single widely accepted 
definition of information risk assessment terminology or a method on how it should be 
conducted. In this respect, the primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to 
information risk assessment by improving the state of the art in terms of methodology. 
The challenge many organizations face is to prioritize the information risks and to 
propose an optimum protection strategy which is both adequate and cost effective, with 
the limited budget dedicated to security and impossibility of protecting each and every 
information asset of every department. An information risk assessment conducted within 
a structured framework on a periodic basis helps to prioritize the risks to information 
assets of the organization and take countermeasures to reduce the risks. 
1.1.1 Need for Assessing Information Risks 
Despite the fact that there have been significant improvements in the practice of 
information security practice; organizations still face wide variety of security incidents 
that have significant impacts upon them. There are also increasing regulatory 
requirements in terms of information security. The increasing need for information risk 
assessment depends on various factors. As outlined by Information Security Forum, some 
of these factors are listed as: 
• New technologies and advancements in information security practice; 
• Increasing number of threats and vulnerabilities; 
• Increasing complexity and connection requirements of the organizations; 
• Regulatory environment and its requirements; 
• Expectations of management in performing more effective security programs; 
• Increasing knowledge in information security in every level of staff that emerges a 
cultural change towards information security risk awareness. 
Today's organizations are highly dependent upon information. While organizations are 
spending the effort to minimize the frequency and magnitude of incidents, hackers and 
other threat sources work on the opposite side to diminish the positive results of these 
efforts on the organizations. E-crime watch survey conducted, by US Secret Service and 
CERT [19], provides data on the type of threats experienced and impact of e-crimes. 
In the complexity of today's organizations, information assets used by different 
departments are interrelated with each other through the IT infrastructure. Protecting all 
of these assets is very challenging, almost impossible. Information risk assessment is a 
tool to prioritize the risks so the organization is able to concentrate on high risk areas. 
The regulatory environment is more demanding and creates an external pressure to 
comply with established regulations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act [54] in the USA, corporate 
governance codes of practice; Turnbull in the UK [53] require management to 
demonstrate that reasonable actions are taken to manage and control risks including 
information risks. Senior management is asked to take precautions to manage 
information security risks more effectively, with the scarce resources and budget in 
information security. The IT Security budget is usually a part of the Information 
Technology Department's budget. However, independent of the size of the budget, it is 
expected that the information assets of the company are protected with effective security 
programs. In addition to this expectation, the investment decisions of the information 
security are being asked to be justified with its benefits. 
The cultural change towards being aware of the information security risks has emerged 
from an increasing trend of interest from employees inside the organization and pressure 
from senior management. Events such as hacking, phishing, viruses, theft are major issues 
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and receive publicity, which diminishes the reputation of the organization. Media 
coverage on these issues ensured that they are recognized on a wider scale. 
With respect to the above factors, we conclude that there is a burden on the practitioners 
to conduct more effective information risk assessments. For this purpose, information 
risk assessment methodology is conducted to set the foundation in protecting information 
assets of the organization. 
1.1.2 Benefits of Assessing Information Risks 
We also look at the benefits of conducting an information risk assessment. Most of these 
benefits are stated by Information Security Forum. Information risk assessment is the 
first step in managing information risks. It classifies critical systems and applications of 
the organization. It serves as a tool for compliance purposes, providing significant inputs 
to making informed decisions in managing information risks, preventing over-control as 
well as under-control and increasing awareness in information risks. It also helps to meet 
customer expectations, serving as a mechanism to lower insurance costs. 
Information risk assessment helps an organization to understand its information risk 
profile. Risks identified within an organization's risk profile are those that may have 
potential negative impacts on the organization, which need to be recognized to take 
appropriate response actions. 
The comprehensive assessment of the information risks helps to meet regulatory 
requirements and provides management with a clear picture of the risk profile within their 
organization. As a result of the risk assessment, controls applicable to the organization's 
needs are identified. Additional costs, liabilities, long term potential negative impacts of 
risks to the organization could be prevented if information risks are properly managed. 
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Another benefit is to meet legal and regulatory requirements. Organizations face 
increasing pressure from legislation and regulation, such as Sarbanes Oxley Act in US 
[54], Basel II [13], and Turnbull in UK [53]. Compliance with regulatory bodies extend 
to Financial Services Authority in UK, the Securities and Exchange Commission in US, 
and the Investment Dealers Associate in Canada, who drive organizations to carry out 
information risk assessments. An effective information risk assessment brings good 
corporate governance and enables an organization to demonstrate compliance to the 
regulations. The third parties, such as external auditors of the organization and the 
regulatory authorities benefit from this experience. 
In the absence of an information risk assessment, controls can be implemented arbitrarily, 
leading to unnecessary costs or points where there is over-control according to the risk 
level. Information risk assessment provides a structured system, through prioritization of 
information risks, enabling the selection of appropriate controls as countermeasures for 
the risks identified and analyzed. This helps to select controls that are cost effective. 
A significant benefit of the information risk assessment is increased awareness in 
information security. As majority of the threat sources are inside the organizations 
compared to external threat sources, awareness and adequate security knowledge of staff 
are critical in the smooth running of day to day operations. 
In order to optimize supply chain efficiency in a complex supply chain management 
structure, as well as, to minimize timescales required to get products to the market, 
require increased collaboration with suppliers. [20] New business initiatives, such as e-
commerce solutions enable increased collaboration, but also bring an increased risk of 
incidents for all parties. Many organizations are aware of these risks and they seek 
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assurance, specifically from their third party suppliers, via contractual agreements, 
periodic auditing, or other solutions. If their requirements are not met, customers will be 
unhappy and potentially seek more reliable suppliers who will provide goods and services 
to their satisfaction level. 
The final benefit is the potential decrease on insurance costs. A cyber attack is perceived 
as high risk for insurance companies, and is more costly than other forms of insurance. 
Special e-risk insurance policies may no longer be required to cover the potential losses 
and liabilities associated with the cyber attacks, for an organization who conducted an 
information risk assessment. 
With respect to the reasons stated and the benefits described, a vast range of activities are 
taken to ensure that the organization is adequately protected. With limited resources and 
budget, it is important to set the priorities appropriately and take adequate actions to 
manage them. Results of an information security risk assessment help to improve 
information security management in staffing, scheduling and budgeting pertaining to 
information security. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the research can be summarized as follows: 
• A survey on the state of the art in information risk assessment methodologies, best 
practices and tools, accompanied with stand-alone analysis of existing methodologies 
for large organizations; 
• Comparative study of selected methodologies, with analysis of their strengths and 
potential improvements, based on a set of criteria and scorecard established; 
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• Elaboration of an integrated information risk assessment methodology that 
leverages the potentials, improves weaknesses of existing methodologies and 
introduces new ideas; 
• Validation of the proposed methodology through case study. 
Our study and proposed approach provides benefits to the following reader groups: 
• Academic professionals who are in the field of information security and risk 
management; 
• Information risk management professionals who undertake developing an 
effective information risk analysis capability within their organization; 
• Consultants who conduct a risk assessment within their client organizations; and 
• The management tier in the organization sponsoring the information security 
program. 
1.3 Thesis Organization and Contributions 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 includes a literature review of existing methodologies, tools and best 
practices in information risk assessment. To the best of our knowledge, we 
introduce all the existing methodologies, electronic tools, standards and best 
practices, used in assessing information risks. We detail the underlying phases of 
each methodology for large organizations and perform a stand-alone analysis by 
evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. We also discuss typical information 
risk assessment requirements. 
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• Chapter 3 is an elaboration of the comparative study of the selected risk 
assessment methodologies. We introduce a methodological approach designed to 
conduct a comparative evaluation of different methodologies in information risk 
assessment. The selected metrics represents the requirements of the present 
information risk assessment methodologies and helps building a well-defined and 
integrated methodology based on commonalities, differences, strengths and 
weaknesses of the present methodologies. 
• Chapter 4 is a presentation of our integrated methodology, covering step by step 
how a risk assessment is to be conducted. Objectives, inputs and outputs of each 
phase are described, while activities to follow throughout the risk assessment are 
explained in detail. We construct further on the common points of the existing 
methodologies, by incorporating the strengths of the reviewed methodologies to 
the new methodology. We also address the weaknesses of the existing 
methodologies and propose new ideas in project management and organizational 
factors. 
• Chapter 5 illustrates an example in undertaking of information risk assessment in 
an organization with a case study, in an attempt to demonstrate the improved 
quality and management of information risk assessment process. 
• Chapter 6 is where the conclusions are outlined. 
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Chapter 2: State of the Art 
2.1 Introduction 
Before presenting the results of our literature review, we summarize what an information 
risk assessment is. An information risk assessment methodology is an approach that 
structures the assessment of information risks. It consists of a precisely defined sequence 
of phases including their associated activities, inputs, outputs in the form of a framework 
for information risk assessment. The objective is to execute these phases during the 
information risk assessment process, including but not limited to identification of the 
information assets, the characterization of their associated threats and vulnerabilities, 
analysis of impacts and likelihood of the incidents, prioritization of risks. It also includes 
conducting a gap analysis and developing a plan to reduce the risks, followed by reporting 
the results. 
Specifically, an information risk assessment can be defined as a structured undertaking 
that examines the information risks associated with the information assets of the 
organization; such as an application and its supporting infrastructure. Within the 
methodology, we identify threats and vulnerabilities that are applicable to an information 
asset. Based on the potential impact and likelihood of incidents, appropriate controls are 
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selected. The controls are used to prevent an incident occurring or to reduce the impact of 
the incident upon the organization. 
In this chapter, we elaborate on structured information risk assessment methodologies for 
large organizations from a literature review. We also introduce the methodologies used 
for systems and small organizations, the guidelines, best practices, international standards, 
and tools in relation to information risk assessment. Herein, we detail the underlying 
phases of each structured information risk assessment methodology for large 
organizations. In addition, we provide an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
each. Before going into the details of each methodology, we first discuss the requirements 
of a typical information risk assessment. Some of these parameters apply to other aspects 
of security, in defining security processes, such as in cyber-forensic processes [15] : 
o Generality: This requirement stipulates that the process needs to be general to be 
applicable to a large variety of organizations in different industries, within 
different information pre-requisites, according to their operating environments. 
o Specificity: This requirement stipulates that the methodology needs to be specific 
in order to precisely guide the information risk analyst or the analysis team, in 
the steps, during the exercise of the risk assessment activities, 
o Documentation: This requirement stipulates that the methodology has 
documented information, guiding the user step by step, 
o Iterativeness: This requirement stipulates that the methodology has provisions to 
be repeated periodically, within a set period of time. This is necessary to monitor 
and control the recommended action items and the results of the information risk 
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assessment from the previous exercise and to understand the level of 
improvement attained, in information risk management. 
o Sequence: This requirement stipulates that the methodology allows for a phase to 
yield its output as input to the previous phase or previous phases. The phases 
should be in an orderly sequence, to guide the analysts conducting the 
information risk assessment, as well as those participants involved in the 
exercise, 
o Tool Support: This requirement stipulates that the assessment and reporting 
should be enforced at the tool level, electronically. The tool can be either a set of 
electronic worksheets to execute the risk assessment or a software tool 
developed, to aid in implementation and reporting. 
In our approach to compiling the literature review, we first reviewed all the published 
references that we have been aware of. In their selection, we first referred to the working 
paper [27] published by the European Network and Information Security Agency which 
includes a consolidated list of the methodologies and standards in relation to information 
security and risk assessment. Then, we reviewed the sources of each methodology, 
standard or best practice to learn about each one specifically. 
We tapped into the expertise of the professionals within source organizations, through 
interviews, meetings and enrolling in training programs of those institutions. Our 
contacts continued with the organizations who have implemented the methodologies and 
with consultants who conduct information risk assessments, on a regular basis. We 
reviewed applicable regulations that relate to information risk assessment and information 
security. 
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In our literature review, to the best of our knowledge, we did not exclude any published 
methodologies. The studied methodologies are: 
• OCTAVE v2: Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation, 
2005 [9] 
Source: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute 
• IRAM : Information Risk Analysis Methodologies, 2005 [34][35] [37] 
Source: ISF: International Security Forum 
•CRAMM :Comprehensive Risk Analysis Management Method, version 5, 2003 
[39], [30] 
Source: Office of Government Commerce of British government (OGC) 
• EBIOS: "Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Securite", 
Release 2, 2004 [24] [25] [26] 
Source: DCSSI: "Direction Centrale de la Securite des Systemes d'Information, 
Premier Ministre", France 
• IT-Grundschutz: IT Baseline Protection Manual, 2005[29] 
Source: Federal Office for Information Security, Germany 
• NIST Standard : SP800-30, 2002 [50], SP800-53 [18] 
Source: National Institute for Standards and Technology 
• CORAS Security Analysis Method [48] [49] 
Source: EU funded CORAS project, with eleven European partners 
• Microsoft Security Risk Management [42], [43], [44] 
Source: Microsoft 
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We also introduced other methodologies related to information risks. These are excluded 
from the scope of evaluation due to relevancy to the parameters presented earlier in this 
chapter in addition to language limitations, structure and scope relevance to our study: 
• SARA: Simple to Apply Risk Analysis, 2005 [31 ] 
Source: ISF: International Security Forum 
• MEHARI: (Methode Harmonisee d'Analyse de Risques Informatique): 
Harmonized Method to Analyze Information Risks, 2004 [22] 
Source: CLUSIF 
• SPRINT: Simplified Process for Risk Identification, 2005 [32] 
Source: ISF: International Security Forum 
• FIRM stands for Fundamental Information Risk Management, 2005 [36] 
Source: ISF: International Security Forum 
• Austrian IT Security Handbook, 2004 [12] 
Source: Austrian Federal Chancellery 
• Dutch A&K Analysis, v 1.01, 1996 
Source: Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs 
• MARION: Methodology of Information Risk Analysis and Optimization by 
Level, 1998 
Source: CLUSIF 
• Swedish Information Processing Assessment 
Source: Swedish Information Processing Society 
• OCTAVE -s vl: OCTAVE for small to medium sized organizations, 2005 
Source: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute 
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We also introduced software tools in risk assessment in addition to those electronic tools 
accompanied within the information risk assessment methodologies in scope of 
evaluation. The software tools reviewed in relation to information risk assessment are: 
• Risk PAC 
Source: CSCI Inc. 
• Countermeasures Risk Analysis Software 
Source: Alion Science and Technology 
• Riskwatch 
Source: Riskwatch 
• BIA (Business Impact Analysis) and LDRPS (Living Disaster Recovery 
Planning Software) 
Source: Strohl Inc. 
The best practices and standards reviewed with respect to information security and 
information risk assessment are: 
• ISO / IEC 13335-2, 2006 (ISO / IEC 27005) 
Source: International Standards Organization, ISO 
• ISO / IEC IS 17799 :2005 
Source: International Standards Organization, ISO 
• ISO / IEC IS 27001 (BS 77992-2:2002) 
Source: International Standards Organization, ISO 
• AS / NZS 4360 : 2004 Australian / New Zealand Standard in Risk 
Management [11] 
Source: Standards Australia International, Standards New Zealand 
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• The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security, 2007 [31] 
Source: ISF: Information Security Forum 
• COB IT: Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology [21] 
Source: IT Governance Institute 
Based on our literature review from here on, we introduce all of the above listed 
methodologies, tools, and standards, with a description. Our evaluation reflects only 
those: 
• Structured information risk assessment methodologies; 
• For large scale organizations; 
• With an accompanying electronic toolkit to provide aid in implementation; and 
• Published in English language or translated to English language. 
Exclusions to our evaluation are: guidelines, standards, best practices, methodologies not 
published nor translated into English language, not structured towards implementation in 
large organizations, not general but focused and highly technically oriented in one 
specific industry specifically, and those methodologies with no accompanying tools to 




OCTAVE stands for the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation. It is developed by Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering 
Institute. It is a qualitative risk assessment methodology. Its last version was published in 
2005. OCTAVE is designed for organizations with more than 300 employees. The 
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OCTAVE methodology consists of three main phases. The first phase starts with building 
asset based profiles. In the second phase, infrastructure vulnerabilities are identified. In 
the third phase security strategy is developed. 
Phase 1: The objective of the first phase is to understand the organization, its information 
assets and associated threats. During the first phase, assets that are critical to the 
organization are defined with their security requirements. The threats and vulnerabilities 
to these assets are identified. Three level workshops are conducted, first level with senior 
management, second level with operational management, and third level with staff. 
During these workshops, current practices in the organization are discussed, and the 
security awareness in the organization is assessed by the analysis team. A security survey 
questionnaire [9], referring to the different security practice areas is embodied within the 
methodology to measure the security awareness of participants. 
Phase 2: The objective of the second phase is to assess threats and vulnerabilities of key 
components that support the critical assets of the organization defined in the first phase. 
The second phase is a technical assessment. First the key components of the information 
assets are identified. Then, technical vulnerabilities are examined by the analysis team, or 
a contractor service in vulnerability assessment. The results are discussed with the 
participants from IT and business. 
Phase 3: The goal of the third phase is to define the impact of a threat occurrence and its 
likelihood. This is done to prioritize security risks of the organization, in order to develop 
a security strategy and mitigation plans. 
Upon completion of the three phases in information risk assessment, OCTAVE 
methodology continues with "monitoring" and "control" phases as part of a risk 
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management process, producing aspects both in risk assessment and risk management. 
OCTAVE methodology is available with set of worksheets, showing the steps in 
conducting the information risk assessment. 
2.2.1.2 Evaluation 
As a reported advantage, OCTAVE has a systematic approach which enables the user to 
understand an organization's information security issues. Analysis team is formed by the 
experts both from the business and IT side who work together throughout the risk 
assessment process. It is the people from the organization who are the ones who direct the 
information security risk evaluation. They participate actively in the execution of the 
assessment and setting the security strategy for their organization. Another advantage is 
in its communication strategies where the participants' opinions are gathered through 
series of workshops and sessions. A security survey that is customizable for the 
organization accompanies the methodology. 
The methodology scores high in generality as it can be implemented to large 
organizations with more than 300 people, serving in a wide variety of industries, although 
it originally started as a project for defense industry and its suppliers specifically. The 
inclusion of "control" and "monitoring" phases enhances its capability for iteration, but 
these two phases are not explained in detail like other phases, as they fall into risk 
management category. 
The pitfalls of OCTAVE emerge in its repetitiveness, where some of the steps could be 
merged in order to make the process less time consuming for the analysis team as well as 
the participants in the organization. Another pitfall is that it does not have threat list 
which includes common threats, where users can refer as basis and select the required 
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inputs, thus more work is required to start from scratch to develop a list specifically for 
the organization. The methodology is accompanied with worksheets and templates, 
however, does not have an automatic tool which can provide findings from the 
worksheets in report format spontaneously. External companies developed their own 
tools to manage vast amount of information collected. 
2.2.2 IRAM 
2.2.2.1 Description 
IRAM is an abbreviation for Information Risk Analysis Methodologies project. [37] It is 
developed by the ISF which stands for the International Security Forum. ISF 
methodologies are SARA, SPRINT and most recently IRAM, which is initiated as a 
project in order to examine the two methodologies SARA and SPRINT and to determine 
how they should be updated. 
The methodology IRAM consists of three key phases. The first phase is "Business 
Impact Assessment". The second phase is "Threat and Vulnerability Assessment". The 
third phase is "Control Selection". Each phase represents a key part of the information 
risk analysis process, with the objective of identifying information risk and 
recommending appropriate controls to ensure the risks are adequately mitigated. 
Phase 1: The objective of the first phase is to assess the negative impacts of security 
incidents to the organization. Impacts are defined as those that arise from the occurrence 
of the threats with the potential to harm the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the 
assets defined as critical by the organization. The adverse impacts of the incidents to the 
organization are graded in five different levels. An explanatory comment is provided for 
each type of impact. The impact assessment is continued with examining the non-
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financial impacts, such as impacts to the reputation of the firm. Once the impact 
assessment is completed, the results are summarized for each critical asset, describing the 
system and rating the impacts to its security requirements. 
Phase 2: The objective of the second phase is to determine threats and vulnerabilities that 
increase the likelihood of serious incidents occurring in a system. It helps to understand 
the detailed security requirements for a system and appropriate next steps that need to be 
taken to protect information. Threat assessment and vulnerability assessment reports are 
produced at the end of this phase, with detailed security requirements. 
Phase 3: The objective of the third phase is to identify the key information risks of the 
organization. They are categorized as external or internal attacks. Controls that 
correspond to minimize the risks are identified. According to the risk level and the cost 
of the control, controls are selected, as countermeasures against risks. 
There are electronic tools to support IRAM methodology in its various steps. The first 
tool is called "BIA Assistant". It enables the information risk analyst to assess the 
possible business impacts that could arise due to a security incident. The "Threat and 
Vulnerability Assessment Assistant" tool enables the information risk analyst to assess 
threats and vulnerabilities, and to determine the likelihood of information incidents and 
the key information risks in a system. The "Control Selection Assistant" tool allows the 
information risk analyst to identify, evaluate and select controls to mitigate information 
risk. 
2.2.2.2 Evaluation 
As a reported advantage, IRAM is a structured, yet flexible methodology, developed 
specifically to meet the needs of information risk analysts in its member organizations. 
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IRAM includes a high level of data collection capability in information security, asking 
for specific inputs. Its reported advantage is that it is documented and supported by 
electronic tools providing the practitioners with specificity on how to conduct the 
information risk assessment and to manage the information accumulated throughout the 
assessment. 
A limitation is the expertise and know how required to provide the necessary inputs to the 
process, decreasing its generality, increasing its specificity. IRAM is more applicable and 
widely used in technology companies with a capability to be applied in other industries. 
The electronic tools of IRAM do not have automatic reporting capability, which may be a 
time consuming exercise. Another disadvantage is that a security survey is not embodied 
within the three phases of IRAM, to understand the level of security awareness within the 
organization. However, "The Standards of Good Practices for Information Security" is a 
survey tool developed by ISF which is updated periodically, can be used together with 
IRAM, to reflect updates in information security practice. 
2.2.3 CRAMM 
2.2.3.1 Description 
CRAMM risk analysis methodology is developed by OGC which is the Office of 
Government Commerce of British Government and stands for Comprehensive Risk 
Analysis Management Method. Its last version is published in 2003, by Insight 
Consulting [30]. The CRAMM methodology includes three phases. The first phase is 
asset identification and evaluation. The second phase is threat and vulnerability 
assessment and the third phase is the selection of countermeasures and recommendation. 
Phase 1: The objective of the first phase is to address asset dependency. It is designed to 
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address specific questions in relation to the security of the systems being analyzed. For 
example, it can be useful in identifying the security functionality required for a new 
application, physical and environmental security at a new site and developing security 
policies for a new system, determining if there is a requirement for specific controls. 
Phase 2: The objective of the second phase is threat and vulnerability assessment. The 
asset data from the first phase is used to assess impacts of threats and vulnerabilities. Its 
toolkit consists of a database with 400 types of assets, 25 different types of impacts, 38 
types of threats to guide the user. The results are demonstrated via graphs within the 
software tool. For example, bar charts are available to assess unavailability values. 
Phase 3: The objective of the third phase is to determine the risks and their 
countermeasures. The evaluation for the risk assessment is guided by a series of tools, 
such as determining the relative priority of controls, recording the estimated costs of 
implementing the controls, modeling changes to the risk assessment, by "what i f 
calculations and back-tracking through the risk assessment for justification of specific 
controls. A "Countermeasure Tree" is used to select relevant controls, classified in 
different areas, like "Network Management", "Network Monitoring", "Information and 
Software Exchange Agreements". The status of the control is specified, whether it is to 
be implemented or if it is already implemented. 
There are seven different measures of risk, as well as a countermeasure library that has 
3,500 security controls in different aspects of information security. Information security 
policy templates, operational security procedures come along with the toolkit. Risk 
assessment data collection screen includes selecting threat type amongst the types of 
threats embodied within the application, choosing the level of impact, for the selected 
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asset groups. The level of threat and vulnerability is graded amongst qualitative criteria 
ranging up to "Very High". Specific comments of the participants can be added to the 
worksheet. 
CRAMM has documented templates to help users to create a wide range of information 
security documentation. The templates include an information security policy, reported as 
compliant with ISO 17799, a description of the security management framework, risk 
analysis report, system security policy. It is reported to comply with the Data Protection 
Act. 
2.2.3.2 Evaluation 
A reported advantage of CRAMM is its capacity to audit the suitability and status of 
security controls on an existing system. Based on its audit capability, it is used by the 
British government and is preferred by government organizations in UK, as well as 
businesses within or outside of UK, mostly in Europe. 
CRAMM scores high on tool support by providing the capability to conduct the steps of 
the risk assessment electronically. The application's functionality is helpful to produce 
comparisons between one assessment and a previous one, thereby allowing users to copy 
findings from an assessment to another. With a capability to produce results in a report 
format and visual presentations of data with graphical representation, the tool enables 
effective presentation to the management. This also provides the capability to quickly 
sum up interim results to keep management informed during the process, which improves 
the awareness and sustains commitment to the program. The database has strong 
attributes in identification of assets and threats, characterization of threats and assessment 
of exposures and risks. Another advantage together with its tool support is its 
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availability, in multiple languages in English, Dutch and Czech for a fee, from its vendor 
Insight Consulting. It is a flexible approach in risk assessment and can be used to look at 
organizations, processes, applications, systems and to investigate their infrastructures. A 
disadvantage is its use being limited to mostly in Europe. 
A disadvantage of its tool support is its associated license cost and the time required for 
software training. While the automatic reporting capability diminishes the time 
consumption in collection and reporting of data, it also requires the time to learn and use 
the tool efficiently in implementation of risk assessment process. 
2.2.4 EBIOS 
2.2.4.1 Description 
EBIOS stands for Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives [24], 
[25], [26]. It is developed and used by the French government; General Secretary of 
National Defense, DCSSI which stands for "Direction Centrale de la Securite des 
Systemes d'Information". Its use extends into private sector and outside of France. 
EBIOS guides are maintained by a team of experts from DCSSI, with respect to best 
practices. EBIOS is reported to provide a global vision to risks and to support the decision 
making process on strategic plans, as well as the tactical plans in protection of security. 
The roles and responsibilities in conducting the risk assessment and implementing the 
preventive actions are designated in between stakeholders. Its last version is published in 
2004. The EBIOS method provides the following reported benefits: 
• Alignment with the organization's strategic goals; 
• Validation in step by step approach; 
• Assessment of risks in the system development process; 
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• Optimized resourcing; and 
• Commitment by the stakeholders. 
There are five phases within the methodology. The first phase is dedicated to 
understanding the organization. In the second and third phase, the areas of concerns are 
discussed and security analysis conducted. Analysis and prioritization of risks are done in 
phases four and five. Residual risks are also determined in the last phase. 
Phase 1: The objective of the first phase is to focus on processes, functions and their 
related information dependencies. As described in EBIOS, a context study is made to 
define process, functions and their information assets, in reference to the organization's 
baseline; related regulations, existing systems and in particular on the overall IS security 
policy. 
Phase 2: The objective of the second phase is to identify needs of the organization which 
primarily involves the project leader and the authority responsible for information risk 
assessment in the organization. The concerns of these parties are discussed. The selected 
security criteria are based on the three usual security criteria: availability, integrity and 
confidentiality. 
Phase 3: The objective of the third phase is to study the threats and detail the areas of 
concerns. A threat study is conducted to define the specifications for the organization as 
well as for the specific systems. Threat identification is made based on the attack 
methods and threat agents. The attack potential of each threat agent is explained. A 
specific vulnerability per threat is determined and the existing protection profiles are 
analyzed to understand their conformity to the identified threats and vulnerabilities. In 
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light of another objective, to measure the effectiveness of the existing countermeasures, 
they are assumed to be not in place. 
Phase 4: The objective of the fourth phase, as reported in EBIOS is to identify security 
objectives. In this phase, the specifications of the organization and systems are refined 
and approved with respect to the significance of their objectives. The risks are identified, 
in the light of the threats formulated. Security objectives are determined and documented. 
Phase 5: The objective of the fifth phase is to determine the security requirements which 
are developed in accordance to the security assurance requirements of the organization. 
The inputs to EBIOS are the information systems security policy and the general 
specifications of the system. An in depth analysis of system specifications is made during 
the information risk assessment process, as only those systems whose objectives are 
known are the objects of the security study. The outputs of the study are a master plan for 
information systems security, a security policy, an action plan for information systems 
security, the security objectives and the protection profile. 
2.2.4.2 Evaluation 
A reported advantage of EBIOS is its use in systems which are in their development 
stage, as well as existing systems. Another advantage is its specificity. Specific studies 
are made on how to use EBIOS through its five steps, in order to guide a user effectively. 
A number of documented studies are available to use EBIOS for developing a security 
strategy and related best practices in information risk assessment and risk management. 
Another advantage is its capability of tool support, as it allows the system study results to 
be recorded and the required summary documents to be produced. Its operation allows 
easy customization of knowledge bases. 
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Other reported advantages include its capability of involving the audience, as it is also 
publicized as an awareness tool, for everyone involved in the project of information risk 
assessment. It has strong attributes in asset and threat identification, characterization of 
threats, assessment of exposures and risks. A reported advantage of EBIOS is that it 
provides a flexible and consistent process, which makes it also a negotiating and decision-
making tool in information security system process. Another advantage is the consistency 
it provides by a unifying vocabulary. It is reported to be compatible with information 
security best practices, such as ISO 17799. 
Its use is mostly in public sector and ministries of French government, and in mainly 
French speaking regions and countries. It is also used in information risk assessment of 
specific systems, including developing systems. 
2.2.5 IT Grundschutz 
2.2.5.1 Description 
IT Baseline Protection Manual is known as IT - Grundschutz in German. [29] It is 
developed by Federal Office of Information Security. Its last version is published in 
2005. IT-Grundschutz certification (or now: ISO 27001 certification on the basis of IT-
Grundschutz) includes inspection of IT security management and IT security safeguards. 
IT Grundschutz provides a framework for establishing information security management 
and presents a method in information risk management. The goals of the organization in 
IT security are set, with respect to the needs of the business. The threats are listed and 
appropriate technical recommendations are provided with respect to the security 
objectives and implementation targets. This is followed with maintenance and 
improvement process in information security. 
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IT Grundschutz handbook [29] displays five threat categories. The first category of 
threats is "force majeure" consisting of sixteen different threat types. Examples are loss 
of personnel, fire, lightning, burning cables. The second category of threats is 
organizational shortcomings, which consists of 107 threat types. Examples include 
insufficient procedures, unauthorized use of rights and uncontrolled use of resources. The 
third category of threats is human failure threats, consisting of 78 threat types, such as 
non-compliance with the IT Security guidelines, improper use of IT system, illegal 
connection of cables. The fourth category is technical failure consisting of 52 threat 
types, such as disruption of power supply, defective data media, disclosure of software 
vulnerabilities. The fifth category includes deliberate acts of 127 threat types, such as 
vandalism, manipulation of data, attacks, theft. 
Safeguards are countermeasures against the listed threats. IT Grundschutz [29] provides a 
list of safeguards. These are categorized into areas of: 
• 162 infrastructure safeguards, including physical and electronic safeguards; 
• 340 organizational safeguards, such as audit of the hardware and software 
inventory; 
• 51 personnel safeguards such as ergonomic workplace and training on IT security 
safeguards; 
• 255 hardware & software safeguards such as screen lock and password protection; 
• 124 network and communications safeguards, such as selection of appropriate 
network topography and selection of cable types; and 
• 96 contingency planning safeguards such as development of a survey for 
availability requirements and responsibilities in an emergency. 
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When modeling a set of IT assets, IT Grundschutz recommends that the modules are 
assigned in accordance with the layer model. This is then followed by validation to ensure 
completeness. The first layer is the generic IT security aspects from which the primary 
elements. These aspects are recommended to be controlled uniformly for all IT assets. IT 
security management, organization of IT operations, training and promotion of staff 
awareness are noted as particularly important in this case. 
The second layer is security of the infrastructure that includes building security, cabling, 
server room, work place at home, mobile work place, and meeting rooms. The third layer 
is the security of IT systems. This layer covers security aspects which refer to IT systems 
and is divided into servers, clients, network components. The fourth layer is the security 
of the network. This layer is concerned with security aspects in the network which do not 
only exclusively apply to specific IT systems. The focus is on security aspects which 
relate to the network connections and communication between the IT systems. The fifth 
layer is the security of applications, which is the lowest layer of the model, including 
mapping of the applications, generally implemented as client/server applications. 
2.2.5.2 Evaluation 
The advantage of IT Grundschutz is in its strong attributes for threat identification and 
characterization, offering a wide selection of safeguards to choose from the appropriate 
ones for the organization. The layer approach of the methodology provides an important 
differentiator which enables completeness check and validation to ensure that the entire 
system has been completely modeled within a layer approach, systematically following 
the layers. 
It has bilingual capability as it is published in English and German. It extends in scope 
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into risk management, beyond the scope of information risk assessment, providing 
recommendations on the implementation of safeguards. Through its documentation, it is 
specific to guide a user with its structured approach. It is a detailed and technically 
oriented assignment, requiring expertise to implement, but also providing set of 
guidelines in security management and information risk. 
A disadvantage is that it does not have automatic tools to use during risk assessment 
which makes it hard to manage the data collection as well as having challenges in the 
reporting of findings, given the vast number of selection possibilities in its threat and 
safeguard catalogue. Another partial disadvantage is the knowledge and expertise 
required to take full advantage of its in depth technical know-how. 
2.2.6 NIST Standard: SP800-30 and SP800-53 
2.2.6.1 Description 
SP 800-30 stands for special publication of 800-30 in risk management, which is a guide 
in information technology systems, developed by the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 2002. In December 2007, NIST published SP 800-53; 
"Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems", where information 
risk management and the criticality of a risk assessment in system development cycle are 
discussed in Section 10. SP 800-53 reduces the nine step process of SP 800-30 into six 
steps, in information risk assessment. SP800-30 provides guidelines for risk assessment 
and risk management in computer security. It is based on US regulations. It includes 
both qualitative and quantitative elements, with graphs and mathematical formulas with 
references. NIST SP 800-30 [50] and NIST SP 800-53 [18] provide guidance in 
information risk assessment in a step by step structure as follows: 
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Step 1: The risk assessment methodology starts with system characterization in its first 
step where the scope of the effort is defined. In this step, the boundaries of the IT system 
with its associated resources are defined. When an IT system is characterized, the scope 
of the risk assessment is established, the operational boundaries are defined, and the 
information on hardware, software, system connectivity are provided and responsible 
division or support personnel essential to defining the risk is identified. 
Step 2: In the second and the third steps, the threats and vulnerabilities are identified. 
The threat-sources are defined as any event with the potential to cause harm to an IT 
system, which can be natural, human, or environmental. Some of the human sources of 
threats are hackers with motivation to challenge self ego taking actions such as system 
intrusions, unauthorized system access and social engineering. Another threat source is a 
person with a revenge motive, involved in a system attack or an industrial espionage by 
unauthorized access to intellectual property of the organization. 
Step 3: The analysis of the threat to an IT system also includes an analysis of the 
vulnerabilities associated with the system environment. The goal of vulnerability analysis 
is to develop a list of system vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the potential threat-
sources [50]. An example of vulnerability could be terminated employees' system 
identifiers not being removed from the system. 
Step 4: The goal of step four is to analyze the controls that have been implemented or 
those that are planned to minimize or eliminate the likelihood and probability of a threat's 
exercising a system's vulnerability. In the updated version of SP 800-53, this step also 
includes determination of the likelihood, to derive an overall likelihood rating that 
indicates the probability of a potential vulnerability. The likelihood that a potential 
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vulnerability could be exercised by a given threat-source is described as high, medium, or 
low. As per NIST SP 800-30, high likelihood is "the threat-source is highly motivated 
and sufficiently capable, and controls to prevent the vulnerability from being exercised 
are ineffective". Medium likelihood is "the threat-source is motivated and capable, but 
controls are in place that may impede successful exercise of the vulnerability". Low 
likelihood is "the threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to 
prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being exercised". 
With the updated version of SP 800-53, Step 4 also includes measuring the level of risk to 
determine the adverse impacts of a threat exercising a system's vulnerability. The adverse 
impact of a security event can be described as "a loss or a degradation of any, or a 
combination of the three security goals: integrity, availability, and confidentiality". Loss 
of public confidence, loss of credibility, damage to an organization's reputation are 
qualified or described in terms of high, medium, or low impacts. The magnitude of an 
impact is defined in terms of its cost, a serious injury leading to loss of life, impact to 
organization's reputation or to the organization's mission. 
Step 5: Step five is where controls and alternative solutions are recommended to 
minimize identified risks. Reported factors critical to be considered in identification of 
controls are effectiveness of recommended options, according to the system capability, 
legislation and regulation, organizational policy, operational impact, safety and reliability. 
Step 6: In step six, the results are documented in a report format. 
2.2.6.2 Evaluation 
The advantage of NIST SP 800-30 and SP 800-53 are providing specific guidelines, in 
conducting information risk assessments, yet they are generic and can be applied to 
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various industries and organizations. The scope includes activities beyond risk 
assessment, such as mitigation options, strategy and an approach for implementing the 
controls. Control activities are divided as operational and strategic control activities, 
which help to determine the duration for action plans through categorization. Cost and 
benefit analyses and concept of residual risk are included in the guide. 
The methodology is accompanied with templates, sample interview questions and a risk 
assessment report outline, which helps it to make easier to follow. It is accompanied with 
figures and tables that guide a user throughout the risk assessment process. [50] A risk 
assessment report template is provided which is helpful in describing the threats and 
vulnerabilities, measuring the risks, and providing recommendations for control 
implementation, as a summary of the work. 
The disadvantage is that it is not available with computer support, where the templates 
could be used electronically and reports could be created automatically for the vast 
number of data collected during the information risk assessment. It is used more as a 
guideline instead of a methodology. 
2.2.7 CORAS 
2.2.7.1 Description 
The security analysis method, CORAS is developed with the participation of eleven 
experts from UK, Greece, Germany, and Norway, in a 4-year project between 1999 and 
2003. The project is funded by European Union. CORAS includes Australian and New 
Zealand Standard for Risk Management, in its foundation. It constitutes of the following 
seven steps: 
Step 1: The first step starts with establishing the context. This step involves an 
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introductory meeting with the participants. Overall goals of the analysis are defined, 
based on the discussion with the client organization. The security analysis method 
CORAS is introduced. The scope of the analysis is determined. The meetings and work-
shops are planned where information will be gathered. The analysis leader, secretary, 
representatives of the client, key decision makers are reported as required in CORAS, 
leaving users and technical staff optional for this step. 
Step 2: The second phase is a high level analysis, where separate meetings with client 
representatives are held. The results of the first meeting are presented and threats, 
vulnerabilities and threat scenarios are discussed. Standardized notations; UML is used, 
with explanations on the notations, to ensure understanding by all participants. [49] 
Activity diagrams, flow-charts are used. Modeling guidelines are available within the 
CORAS methodology. A region is drawn which logically and physically represents the 
target of analysis. [49] 
Step 3: The third step involves approval on assets and a more precise description of the 
target to be analyzed. The client approves the target assets and ranks them according to 
their importance. The "consequence scales" and "likelihood scale" are set for each asset, 
within the scope of the analysis. 
Step 4: Step four includes a risk identification workshop, gathering people with expertise 
in the evaluation of the target assets. Incidents that may potentially be harmful to the 
organization are identified, with threats and vulnerabilities. Human threats are divided 
between deliberate and accidental actions, while non-human threats are analyzed 
separately. Assets that are not harmed by any of the incidents are taken out of scope, in 
this step. 
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Step 5: Step five is risk estimation where each risk is assessed with respect to its 
likelihood of occurrence. Help of visual diagrams is used. 
Step 6: Step six provides a risk portfolio, which is a first estimate of the complete risk 
diagram provided to the organization. Risk diagrams are modeled, into overall risk 
matrix, by an explanation on each risk. 
Step 7: The last step is devoted to the treatment of the risks, where treatment options are 
identified addressing the cost and benefits. The step is organized as a workshop. 
Treatment options are also added to the risk diagram that is developed on the basis of the 
threat diagram. 
2.2.7.2 Evaluation 
The strength of CORAS is in its tool support and its illustration that stimulates the process 
and improves the communication. Drawings, pictures and sketches are used in order to 
better communicate with the audience during information collection. Each phase has a 
distinct purpose where different outputs are produced, using graphical security risk 
modeling language based on UML, as reported in CORAS methodology. It includes a 
computerized integration tool, and XML mark-up for exchange of risk assessment data 
and a vulnerability assessment report format, to conduct the information risk assessment 
review. Another advantage is that a facilitated brainstorming session is conducted within 
the methodology, as one of the techniques employed in collecting information for risk 
identification that integrates the audience in the process. Another advantage is its 
structure in a way that responsibilities and roles of the participants in each one of the 
seven steps are specified, which helps in resource planning and outlining the initial 
project plan. 
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In terms of generality, its use is mostly in Northern Europe and is not an internationally 
recognized on a wider scale, eg. North America. It requires specific know-how to be 
implemented with consultancy from its producer. It includes a number of charts and 
graphics which makes it easy for the user to understand, but also requires time invested in 
preparation and learning of the method by the analysis team in order to accurately conduct 
the assessment. 
2.2.8 Microsoft's Security Risk Management 
2.2.8.1 Description 
The Microsoft security risk management process includes a structured four step 
methodology and is accompanied by electronic worksheets. Microsoft methodology 
comprises of four phases, where risk assessment is discussed in its first two phases. 
Phase 1: In the first phase, risks are identified and prioritized according to the business. 
The risks are assessed in facilitated discussions by gathering information about assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities, controls and suggested risk treatment options. Gathering risk data 
involves two stages: collection of risk data and its prioritization. In gathering risk data, 
the data collection process and analysis take place. In prioritizing risks, it is important to 
outline the prescriptive steps to qualify and quantify risks. The data gathering template to 
identify assets includes threat definition, vulnerability, level of exposure and current 
controls on the physical, application, host, network and data layers. [42] 
Phase 2: The second phase involves identification and evaluation of controls, based on a 
cost benefit analysis process to select possible control solutions. Solutions are reviewed 
and evaluated against the functional requirements of systems. Risk reduction amount and 
costs are estimated, considering "the direct and indirect costs associated with mitigation 
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solutions". The outcome of this phase is risk treatment options. Summary risk templates 
and an example are provided within the Microsoft methodology with data. [42]. 
Phase 3: The third phase includes implementing the controls, by considering people, 
processes, technology. Mitigation solutions across the business are determined. 
Phase 4: The fourth phase is focused in measuring the effectiveness of the information 
risk management program by monitoring the treatments. Risk scorecard is developed to 
understand the risk posture and progress. This phase also covers the ongoing process of 
identifying new, potential risks, to provide the expected degree of protection. 
Microsoft's methodology provides guidelines on the importance of risk communication 
with the reason that various people involved in the risk assessment process define risk 
differently. It advises to ensure consistency in definition of terms across all stages of an 
information risk management cycle, to agree upon single definition of risk at the 
beginning. It guides the user to determine the organization's risk management maturity 
level, how to define roles and responsibilities and to build the risk management team. 
2.2.8.2 Evaluation 
The advantage of the methodology is that it includes not only risk assessment but also risk 
management by conducting decision support, implementing controls, and measuring 
program effectiveness, however the pitfall of this approach is that it introduces much 
larger scope than the boundaries of an information risk assessment, decreasing the 
specifity characteristic. The methodology is strong in itirativeness, as the cycle of risk 
management is defined as an ongoing program, allowing the information risk assessment 
to be re-started at regular intervals to refresh the data in each stage. This period is 
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reported in Microsoft to be usually aligned periodically with an organization's fiscal 
accounting cycle to align budget requests for controls with normal business processes. 
The methodology, having a wide-scope has the disadvantage of loosing its depth, as there 
are only a few worksheets that accompany the methodology. There is no automatic 
capability for collection of data or the reporting of data by graphical representations. The 
documentation provides a direction and a perspective to its user, in information risk 
management. While it is generic, it is more effective to implement in technology 
organizations like Microsoft itself as it embodies the expertise in IT companies like 
Microsoft. 
As in all of the above methodologies discussed, there is no quantification on risk. 
2.2.9 SARA 
SARA [31] which stands for Simple to Apply Risk Analysis is reported as a detailed 
methodology for analyzing information risk in critical information systems, developed by 
ISF which stands for International Security Forum. It is examined and combined with 
another methodology; SPRINT [32] and updated into a new methodology; IRAM which 
we discussed earlier. 
Sections of SARA include "IT Risk Management Process", "IT Risk Management 
Model", and "Risk Analysis in the Systems Development Life Cycle". Its application for 
different systems and it displays the dependencies between these systems. First, baseline 
controls and system specific controls are established. The control requirements and 
techniques are then selected. The main steps in the method are described as meeting with 
the system owner, meeting with the systems development manager, a workshop to assess 
business impact; and another workshop to assess vulnerability and control requirements. 
37 
SARA is focused on conducting risk analysis, specifically on application and system 
basis. In addition to an application, a system is specified to include a database and IT 
infrastructure to support the application. It is applied in the life cycle of the development 
of an application, as the risk analysis method prior to system implementation; 
recommended for planning and feasibility assessment, definition of system requirements, 
design and build. It is applied during live operation and prior to a major change as well. 
SARA is designed to support the risk analysis for applications of all sizes from small PC 
based systems to large mainframe based applications in development. Its application 
varies according to the scale and complexity of the application. For large mainframe 
based applications, many workshops may be required to analyze the risks while separate 
workshops may be appropriate for confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
2.2.10 MEHARI 
MEHARI [22] is a product of CLUSIF which is a French organization oriented to 
information security. It replaces the MARION methodology and stands for "Harmonized 
Method to Analyze Information Risks". It is updated in 2004. When MARION 
methodology was no longer sponsored by CLUSIF it was replaced by MEHARI. 
MEHARI provides a risk assessment model, as well as an approach to define 
countermeasures for risk reduction with respect to the objectives of the organization. It 
has quantitative elements in it and has an audit flavor, like MARION. The documentation 
and its accompanying tools being in French, its use is restricted to French speaking 
regions, including government organizations in Quebec, as well as the private sector. 
The risk assessment model used by MEHARI is based on an evaluation of the potential 
impact of a risk scenario based on its potentiality and the strength of the measures in place 
38 
to mitigate the risk. Risk assessment is performed directly by scoring the impact for each 
scenario, within measures specified as "dissuasive", "preventive", "protective", 
"palliative", based on the evaluation of the vulnerability in different category of events. 
MEHARI is reported to provide a risk assessment model in modular components and 
processes, while enhancing the ability to find out vulnerabilities through assessment, 
analyzing the risk situations out of the 171 risk scenarios situated in its knowledgebase. It 
includes formulas for threat identification and threat characterization, with optimal 
selection of corrective actions. It has strong quantitative attributes. While it is 
accompanied with Risi-Base software to facilitate the data collection and information risk 
assessment process, being available in French and not translated to English restricts its 
use beyond French speaking regions. 
2.2.11 SPRINT 
SPRINT [32] stands for Simplified Process for Risk Identification is used in assessing 
business impact and analyzing information risk in important information systems that are 
not critical. It is a complementary methodology that is designed to be used with SARA 
discussed earlier and is again developed by ISF which stands for International Security 
Forum. 
SPRINT is reported as a method for analyzing the business risks associated with an 
information system and for the safeguards or controls. [32] The levels of risk associated 
with a system are determined to guide the user in selection of action items for keeping 
risks within acceptable predetermined limits. The vulnerabilities of existing systems and 
the safeguards are determined. The security requirements for systems under development 
and the controls needed to satisfy them can also be identified, by using SPRINT. 
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It has three main phases. In the first phase, the level of business risk associated with an 
information system is assessed, where the consequences and impact of a loss are 
determined with respect to the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information 
processed by the system. The second phase identifies the controls needed to keep risks 
within acceptable limits, by considering the threats and vulnerabilities which could lead to 
a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability. The third phase produces an agreed plan 
of action for implementing required controls, by considering the priority of controls 
identified. 
2.2.12 FIRM and the Survey 
FIRM [36] stands for Fundamental Information Risk Management and is published by 
ISF; Information Security Forum. It provides an approach to control and monitor an 
organization's information risks. FIRM includes a guideline for communication, gaining 
support of stakeholders and implementation. An "Information Risk Scorecard" is a part 
of FIRM, used to collect information on a particular asset. The information collected on 
an asset includes its owner, its degree of criticality, the threats and level of threats to its 
security. Therefore, it can be used as an accompanying tool in information risk 
assessment. 
2.2.13 Austrian IT Security Handbook 
Austrian IT Security Handbook is originally developed by Austrian Federal Chancellery, 
for government organizations.[12] It includes a generic description of how risk 
assessment should be conducted. 
The hand book has two parts where the first part provides a detailed description of the IT 
security management process, including development of security policies, risk analysis. 
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The second part concentrates on security measures, providing two hundred thirty baseline 
security measures with an implementation tool. The methodology is now used by 
businesses, while it has been developed originally for the government. The methodology 
is reported to be compliant with ISO / IEC IS 13335 and ISO / IEC IS 17799. Its last 
version is published in 2004. 
2.2.14 MARION 
MARION is a product of CLUSEF which is a French organization oriented to information 
security. MARION translates into "Methodology of Information Risk Analysis and 
Optimization by Level". 
It is structured as an information security audit, including a security questionnaire. The 
method has quantitative elements in it, where the security level is estimated in six subject 
areas, with levels assigned a grade between zero and four based on their maturity. The 
risks are identified in light of the responses from the questionnaire while the process is 
followed by a detailed threat and vulnerability analysis. 
MARION methodology is no longer sponsored by CLUSEF and is replaced by MEHARI 
which stands for "Harmonized Method to Analyze Information Risks". 
2.2.15 SBA 
SBA which stands for Swedish Information Processing Assessment is developed by 
Swedish Information Processing Society. SBA is reported as a flexible and simple to use 
qualitative method for classifying assets, identifying security weaknesses and 
recommending countermeasures. The SBA methodology consists of three phases. The 
first phase is the "analysis phase". The second phase is "executive phase" and the last 
phase is "wind-up phase". 
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2.2.16 OCTAVE-s 
OCTAVE - s is developed by Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering 
Institute which stands for the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation. Like OCTAVE, it is a qualitative risk assessment methodology. Its last 
version is published in 2005. While OCTAVE is designed for organizations with more 
than 300 employees, OCTAVE-s is its modified version for smaller size organizations 
with less than 300 employees. OCTAVE-s is left out of our scope of evaluation, as it is 
not applicable for large scale organizations. 
2.3 Electronic Tools 
The following tools discussed are software packages in security, available at a license fee, 
from their vendors. They can be used for large scale organizations' information risk 
assessments. We have provided a brief description on them; however, left them out of 
scope of our assessment. 
2.3.1 Risk PAC 
Risk PAC is a software tool. It is developed with respect to a risk assessment 
methodology, integrated within the tool. The owner of the software tool is CSCI Inc. 
which is based in USA. Risk PAC is a software-based tool that is reported to be used to 
identify threats, to conduct analysis of the risks and to determine cost-effective counter-
measures in order to mitigate risks. The Risk PAC methodology includes four phases. 
The first phase is composed of questions in security subject areas, including but not 
limited to information security. The second phase displays the risk profiles assessed in 
response to the questions. The third phase presents recommendations that propose 
solutions. The fourth phase maps tables that relate the results of questionnaire in the 
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second phase, based on the scoring of the recommendations in the third phase. 
2.3.2 Countermeasures Risk Analysis Software 
Countermeasures Risk Analysis Software is reported to provide reporting of both 
information and physical security, including critical infrastructure, port and school 
security, anti-terrorism force protection by Alion Science and Technology. As reported 
by the vendor, the phases are developed based on: 
• data collection; 
• analysis of threats; 
• prioritizing risks iteratively; 
• generating management level reports with graphs in threat vulnerability 
assessment; 
• justification of funding by showing return on investment; 
• managing the security data in a central database; and 
• responses to issues and inquiries. 
2.3.3 Riskwatch 
Riskwatch software is focused towards physical and homeland security, identifying 
assets, determining values for assets, identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities, safeguards 
and determining a plan to implement the safeguards. It includes, but is not limited to the 
assessment of information risks. Its steps include "preparation phase" where scope of the 
risk assessment is set and parameters are selected, assets and their values are defined, 
threat data is evaluated to identify vulnerabilities, degree of loss and safeguard 
identification is done through a cost and benefit analysis. 
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2.3.4 BIA/LDRPS 
BIA standing for Business Impact Analysis and LDRPS standing for Living Disaster 
Recovery Planning Software are both software products from Strohl Inc. that support 
information security. As they are flexible tools, they can be customized according to the 
specific needs of the organization, though neither can be classified as information risk 
assessment tool specifically. 
The first tool BIA [51] is used to conduct business impact analysis, based on a similar 
approach like in the other methodologies in information risk assessment is the first phase 
of the IRAM methodology. LDRPS [52] is another software product used for business 
continuity planning and IT disaster recovery planning that form protection strategies that 
may be required as a countermeasure with respect to the findings from an information risk 
assessment. LDRPS is a flexible database tool and can be customized to be used for risk 
assessment. 
2.4 Standards and Best Practices 
2.4.1 ISO/IEC IS 13335-2 
ISO / IEC IS 13335 - 2 is an international standard, developed by ISO; International 
Standards Organization. Its last version is published in 2006. It includes guidelines to 
information risk analysis and describes the process of information security management. 
List of common threats and security controls are available within the standard 
documentation, for user selection. 
2.4.2 ISO/IEC IS 17799 
ISO / IEC IS 17799 [40] is an international standard, originally developed as a British 
standard and adapted to ISO. It is updated version is published in 2005. It includes 
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information security best practices that support information risk assessment, but does not 
provide a method on how to conduct a risk assessment. 
2.4.3 ISO/IEC IS 27001 
Reference ISO / IEC IS 27001 is used for certification and includes a set of information 
security controls that can be to be implemented upon conducting a formal risk assessment. 
Its last version is in 2005, as it is discussed in methodologies section, under "IT 
Grundschutz" [29]. 
2.4.4 AS/NZS4360 
Reference AS / NZS 4360: 2004 is Australian / New Zealand Standard in risk 
management. It is latest version is published in 2004. AS / NZS 4360 [11] is different 
from the international standards listed above, in the aspect that it is not specific to 
information security risks, but is a generic approach to risk assessment and risk 
management. It does not provide a framework on how to conduct information security 
risk analysis specifically. It provides guidelines for establishing the context, identifying, 
analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and communicating risk. The concepts in this 
standard are applicable and furthermore essential for any type of risk assessment, 
including information security risks. It refers to a risk management process that can be 
applied in a variety of sectors and a range of different subject areas. 
2.4.5 The Standard of Good Practices for Information Security 
The Standard of Good Practices for Information Security is first released in 1996, by ISF 
and is updated every two years. Its latest version is published in 2007 [31]. It sets the 
foundation to develop the information security survey questions that can be used as part 




COBIT stands for "Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology", 
published by IT Governance Institute, provides a set of guidance materials for IT 
governance, which are recognized internationally. The risk management ingredient in 
COBIT is embodied through the guidance it provides to management and information 
security professionals, in setting up the control framework that aligns IT with the mission 
and objectives of the business, to bring value to the business and manage IT risks 
appropriately, through best practices. COBIT control practices are available from the 
internet site of ISACA, free of charge to its members. 
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Chapter 3: Comparative Study 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to compare the previously evaluated information risk assessment 
methodologies, with respect to the metrics identified. The objective is to identify the 
common points of the methodologies, the points essential in an information risk 
assessment, strengths of these methodologies, as well as their limitations. Our intent in 
the next chapter is to design a new information risk assessment process by leveraging the 
positive features while improving the weaknesses to manage the quality of the risk 
assessment process. The approach provides guidelines for both researchers and 
practitioners in information risk assessment to adopt the methodology in different 
conditions and organizations. 
The framework for comparison focuses only on the selected methodologies in information 
risk assessment. The basis of our selection is more prominent methodologies in 
information risk assessment that are explained in a phase by phase structure, but are also 
accompanied with tools to guide the user step by step on how to conduct an information 
risk assessment for a large organization, where their documentation and tools are 
available in English language. 
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This section introduces a methodological approach designed to provide the ability to 
conduct a comprehensive comparative evaluation of different methodologies which drive 
the information risk assessment process. The proposed comparative approach stems 
primarily from conducting information risk analysis in various organizations. Such 
evaluation framework refers to a selected set of critical attributes that represent the 
requirements of the present information risk assessment methodologies. This framework 
also helps defining an integrated methodology, based on an analysis where the 
commonalities and differences of the existing methodologies are emphasized with their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
3.2 Criteria 
The resulting requirements and features are broadly classified into structural, 
identification, techniques, training, functionality, usability, consistency, tool support and 
organizational criteria. Some of the criteria listed apply to enterprise risk assessment 
process and security processes, besides information security, such as in cyber-forensic 
processes [15]: 
• Structure: This criterion reveals the process actions on conducting a full information 
risk assessment in a given environment and organization. Structure provides a step by step 
approach and directs a user in a more structured way than guidelines, best practices and 
standards in security and risk. The structure, however, needs to be easily customized into 
the needs of the organization being assessed, for the security risk analyst or the analysis 
team to act correctly, according to organization's needs and requirements. 
• Identification: This feature represents all specific procedures that an analysis team 
needs to follow to scope the assessment. Indeed, an organized and controlled method of 
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identification is required. Processes, information assets, threats, vulnerabilities, impacts, 
risks are the elements that need to be identified, throughout an information risk 
assessment, in order to select the critical ones. A catalogue of threats and a list of security 
practice areas are available within the methodology, for reference purposes. 
• Techniques: An important feature regarding the information risk assessment 
methodology lies in the need to provide practitioners with appropriate, updated, and 
improved techniques to properly gather, analyze, and report the findings of an information 
risk assessment. 
• Training: This is a vital requirement for information risk analysts and the participants 
of the information risk assessment process to focus on acquiring sufficient knowledge and 
basic skills to enable them to adequately perform the tasks regarding information risk 
assessment. One of the results achieved in conducting an information risk assessment in 
an organization is increased awareness of organization's members in their level of 
security understanding. 
• Functionality: Information risk assessment processes and tasks are required to provide 
effective functionalities in the course of challenging activities performed in identification, 
information collection, analysis, validation, reporting and presentation of the results. The 
purpose of an information risk assessment methodology is to allow the analysis team to 
perform a variety of functions, in accordance with established requirements. In this 
respect, the core functions of an information risk assessment methodology can be clearly 
identified as: 
- Data Collection: Data collection or acquisition from a source is the most 
significant function of an information risk assessment process. While most of the 
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data is collected via interviews or work-sessions, historical organizational data is 
also valuable to the process. 
- Analysis: Once the necessary data has been collected, the next step is 
examination and analysis. Analysis is an essential function through which the 
information risk specialist or the analysis team derives useful information. It 
refers to the process of interpreting the extracted data, through a set of activities. 
- Validation: It refers to validation of the information gathered and results with 
the participants, to ensure accuracy of the information and results compiled. 
- Reporting: It refers to the important phase where the tasks are completed and 
accurate reporting of the findings is required. In this respect, comprehensive 
documentation including findings in each phase and the final result on the overall 
risk profile of the organization, with suggested security protection strategy and 
mitigation actions. 
- Presentation: Presentation of the results is an important factor in 
communication. While establishing an ongoing communication throughout the 
risk assessment project, the final results are presented to the executive 
sponsorship, participants, and the stakeholders of the information risk assessment. 
• Guidance - Organizational Factors: This criterion reveals the guidance that the 
methodology provides to attain organizational support which is a crucial success factor, in 
conducting a full information risk analysis, in a given environment and organization. The 
information risk assessment methodology should provide guidance on the following 
organizational factors in order to attain a successful result: 
- Sponsorship: This feature represents necessity of senior management to 
support the information risk assessment process. Absence of this support will 
most likely lead to stakeholders resisting to participate or to underestimate the 
efforts of the process. There are many reasons why required participants, 
including employees and upper management may fail to cooperate, of which two 
can be summarized as resistance to change and insufficient knowledge in 
information security. They may also not be aware of the benefits. 
- Stakeholders: These are the members of an organization with a vested interest 
in the results of the security risk assessment. Stakeholder engagement to the 
process is critical in its success, and an engagement process must be included in 
the guidelines. Prior to start of the process in information risk assessment, 
stakeholders, including the analysis team and the sponsors need to be identified. 
- Maturity Level: The organization's maturity in risk management culture 
makes it easier to implement the information risk assessment. If the organization 
does not have security risk management process in place, it involves significantly 
higher effort to conduct an information risk assessment and it involves too much 
change to implement an information security program. 
- Open Communication: Projects usually operate on a need-to-know basis. This 
may lead to misunderstandings or gaps in communication. Open communication 
refers to sharing of the findings and information collected throughout the risk 
assessment process with the team and the stakeholders in a continuous and a 
planned manner. 
— Analysis Team: The analysis team refers to the team who conducts the 
information risk assessment, analyzes the results from the information risk 
assessment process and prepares the results in a report format to be presented to 
appropriate management team. It is extremely important for the analysis team to 
foster a spirit of teamwork and be representative of the overall organization with 
members in different areas of expertise. 
- Authority: Participants in the risk assessment process accept responsibility for 
identifying and taking actions to control the most critical security risks to the 
organization for which they require sufficient level of authority, from 
management. 
• Usability: This criterion is the degree in ease of use of the methodology and how well 
the analysis team can use the methodology to perform information risk assessment tasks 
with effectiveness, efficiency and to required satisfaction levels. 
— General: This requirement stipulates the solutions accommodated in the 
methodology must support different organizations, operating in a variety of 
environments, in different industries, with the necessity of organizations to 
comply with different set of regulations. 
- Descriptive: The requirement stipulates that the methodology is to incorporate 
relevant and detailed guidelines, procedures which lead to the successful 
completion of each phase and overall information risk assessment process. These 
procedures should be documented. 
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• Consistency: This criterion refers to the consistency in application of the 
methodology by different team members. One factor effective in helping to attain 
consistency is setting the definition of the terms in information risk assessment. 
• Tool Support: The methodology is much easier to use if supported by tools that 
implement the tasks to be performed and provide ease of customization according to 
the organization's needs. 
3.3 Comparison 
A common definition of the terms referred in the information risk assessment process is 
established to promote a common understanding. After the stand-alone analysis of the 
methodologies presented in Chapter 2, we compare the methodologies in information risk 
assessment for large organizations. These models have distinct characteristics and specific 
advantages and disadvantages, despite their similarities. 
Comparing existing methodologies of information risk assessment is helpful in drafting 
an initial list of requirements for the new methodology, based on the criteria developed in 
Section 3.2, in addition to the initial criteria defined in the stand alone analysis of 
methodologies, in Chapter 2. Based on these requirements and characteristics, the table 
below provides a comparison of the activities, tasks, and processes corresponding to each 
methodology in information risk assessment. 
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Qualitative Measure of Criteria - Structure 
Level I Units of measure: Methodology is structured 
High I Methodology is divided in phases where each phase outputs are clearly defined 
I to guide the user step by step. 
Medium I Methodology is divided in phases where major activities in each phase are 
I explained, however inputs and outputs of each phase is not clearly structured. 
Low I Methodology is a series of guidelines. 
Table 3-1: Grading for Structure 





Units of measure: Identification. 
Identification of essential parameters is executed throughout the process, as 
well as for scoping in the early stages of the assignment. A catalogue is used to 
choose the relevant ones (assets/ threats / vulnerabilities) for the organization. 
Identification is done throughout the risk assessment in an iterative manner. 
Identification is a limited characteristic of the methodology. 
Table 3-2: Grading for Identification 





Units of measure: Techniques used 
Methodology is very rich in using specific techniques, to better gather, analyze, 
evaluate, report results, (eg. quantitative models to evaluate risks, graphical 
models to represent data) 
Methodology makes use an adequate amount of techniques to gather, analyze, 
evaluate, report results. 
Methodology is limited in techniques to gather, analyze, evaluate, report results. 
Table 3-3: Grading for Techniques 
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Units of measure: Training 
Methodology provides significant training and awareness capability to all of its 
stakeholders, participants and the analysis team, with a specific section on 
security training and awareness. 
Methodology provides training and awareness capability to selected group of 
stakeholders, participants and the analysis team conducting the information risk 
assessment. 
Methodology provides general awareness and training capability. 
Table 3-4: Grading for Training 





Units of measure: Functionality 
Methodology provides strong attributes to perform the required functions: 
"Data Collection", "Analysis", "Validation", "Reporting", "Presentation", 
throughout the risk assessment process. 
Methodology provides adequate functionality to perform the required functions. 
Methodology provides limited functionality to perform the required functions. 
Table 3-5: Grading for Functionality 





Units of measure: Guidance 
Methodology provides excellent guidance on organizational factors that impact 
the successful implementation of an information risk assessment. These include 
executive sponsorship, stakeholders, maturity level, open communication, 
formation of an analysis team, and authority. 
Methodology provides organizational factors, with guidelines on their 
implementation in undertaking of information risk assessment. These guidelines 
are specific to the targeted industry group. 
Methodology provides guidance in organizational factors, with limited 
guidelines on how to implement them. 
Table 3-6: Grading for Guidance in Organizational Factors 
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Units of measure: Usability 
Methodology has detailed guidelines for each phase, yet it can be used in 
various industries with a small degree of customization. 
Methodology has guidelines for activities on a generic level in each phase and 
can be used in various industries, if customized properly. Its use is regional. 
Methodology has guidelines in a descriptive manner, while its use stays limited. 
Table 3-7: Grading for Usability 





Units of measure: Consistency 
Methodology provides consistency within the approach in terms and definitions 
to guide users in the same direction. 
Methodology provides a common understanding with no established glossary or 
reference of terms. 
Methodology may be interpreted differently by different audience, has limited 
elements to attain consistency. 
Table 3-8: Grading for Consistency 





Units of measure: Tool Support 
Methodology is supported by an electronic tool, which provides templates for 
each activity, as well as reporting and graphical presentation capability. 
Methodology is supported by an electronic tool, which provides templates for 
each activity. 
Methodology is supported by templates only. 


































































































































Table 3-10: Comparative Criteria 
The above table depicts the overall criteria on which we compare the present 
methodologies. Based on the descriptions for each methodology in Chapter 2, we 
conclude that each methodology adopts and incorporates a set of phases, tasks, or 
processes, such as identification of information assets, threat and vulnerability 
assessment, risk analysis, risk prioritization, understanding the level of maturity in 
information security, security awareness and training, communications planning, project 
planning, in different levels. 
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These activities are commonly considered to greatly influence the successful outcomes of 
an information risk assessment. A common inherent feature characterizing these 
frameworks is the presence of basic functionalities that form the core of a risk assessment 
methodology, such as data collection, analysis, validation, reporting and presentation. 
This derives a general trend towards building and implementing standardized frameworks 
of information risk assessment, designed to understand the information risks of the 
organization. Appropriate actions are performed at each step of the information risk 
assessment in pursuit of the final goal of determining a profile of the organization's 
information security risks. 
Structure: Methodologies in information risk assessment provide - through phases 
consisting of several activities - the ability to perform several steps: asset identification, 
measuring organization's security understanding, threat and vulnerability assessment, 
impact assessment and risk assessment. While structure is critical to guide a user in 
implementation of information risk assessment, it also brings limitations in flexibility to 
customize the methodology which may be required to use the methodology across 
different industries. 
The existing methodologies discussed are structured in phases and activities. The steps of 
each methodology are described in Chapter 2. NIST 800-30 and IT Grundschutz can also 
be presented as guidelines. The tasks executed in different phases remain the same, 
although their sequence may change from one methodology to the other. As a result of 
this, the phases can be viewed as misplaced. For example, the impact analysis is made 
in the first phase of the IRAM methodology, whereas it is placed in the third phase of the 
OCTAVE methodology. The structure of EBIOS is specific for defense industry and 
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French government, as its original development reason. Microsoft's structure is also very 
adaptable to IT companies like Microsoft, bringing an element of specificity to its 
structure. 
Identification: The characteristics identified in each phase are different from one 
methodology to another, which impacts how they approach determining scope. 
Identification is critical in the initial scoping of the effort. OCTAVE scopes the effort 
iteratively in the first phase, while also bringing an element of validation. This is done 
trough identification of inputs (assets, the areas of concerns, and the security requirements 
of the organization) in the first three processes, starting with the senior management, 
continuing with the operational management and ending with the staff level. In IRAM, 
the scope is determined prior to the start of the first phase. The critical assets of the 
organization are identified prior to conducting business impact analysis. This activity is 
usually done during the first phase of the other methodologies. NIST SP 800-30, SP 800-
53 and Microsoft also include a risk management, presenting a wider scope of analysis. 
The criticality determines the scope of the assessment. As the critical information assets 
and their dependencies are identified within the risk assessment, the scope is revised. 
Therefore, it is ideal to prepare a draft scope at the beginning of the project and revise as 
more information is gained during the assignment. 
Techniques: Different techniques are employed in the methodologies and at different 
stages of the information risk assessment project. One commonality is that IRAM, IT 
Grundschutz, CRAMM, EBIOS, CORAS, NIST SP 800-30 propose a catalogue of threats 
to select the appropriate ones for the organization. Microsoft and OCTAVE do not 
include a threat catalogue. The list of threats is specific to each organization; however, a 
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starting list is useful for the organizations who are conducting the information risk 
assessment for the first time. 
In terms of presentation, CRAMM includes techniques for better visibility and 
communication, such as the graphical representation of the results and reporting through 
its software, CORAS uses visual techniques, OCTAVE refers to the threat tree diagrams. 
The other methodologies provide templates, but do not include specific visual tools or 
graphical representation of results for easier management review. 
None of the present information risk assessment methodologies involve quantitative risk 
assessment techniques. Risk evaluation is the one of the most critical steps in present 
methodologies. The present methodologies do not propose a model nor refer to 
quantitative approaches in evaluating information risks, although there are many software 
tools available for modeling and quantifying of risks in other areas outside of information 
security, which can be adapted to the information risk assessment methodologies. 
Another pitfall is that risk evaluation depends on a set of criteria which is highly impacted 
by the subjectivity of the participants. Iteration, review and validation of the results 
decrease this ambiguity to a certain extent, while including the participants in the process 
helps them to own the implementation exercise of the security. Thus, open 
communication, knowledge transfer, change management are critical organizational 
factors in the process. 
Training: Information risk assessment is the first step to help a given organization in 
reducing and successfully responding to information risks. A training program for the 
analysis team conducting the assessment, as well as a staff training and awareness 
program in information security is necessary to accompany the process in handling 
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information security risks. While information security is perceived as primarily 
information technology staff's responsibility, given the fact that most threats are internal 
to the organization, it requires everyone's contribution to reduce the risk. The majority of 
the methodologies include information security best practices, like ISO 17799 which 
provides internationally recognized best practices in information security and can be 
leveraged in a survey form. This survey is critical to measure the awareness of 
participants in information security risks and practices, but also is used as a tool to 
increase awareness. The organization's specific control environment is also a critical 
input to consider in preparation of the questions for a survey which measures participants' 
awareness in security. 
The minority of the present methodologies have formal trainings organized by the source 
organizations to transfer the knowledge necessary to the analysis team of the 
organizations, like OCTAVE provided by Carnegie Mellon University. These training 
programs include exercises that practice the activities in each phase. A larger scale of 
training program is not available with the methodologies and is employed separately for 
information security by those organizations who realize its importance. 
Functionality: "Data Collection", "Analysis", "Validation", "Reporting" and 
"Presentation" represent major activities in each methodology, while some of the 
methodologies consist of these attributes more than the others. CRAMM with its 
software improves the automated reporting capability. CORAS makes use of the visual 
tools that are helpful in presentation of the data. In OCTAVE, results from each phase are 
validated at the closure of the phase. EBIOS, NIST SP 800-30, IT Grundschutz and 
Microsoft methodologies provide guidelines. 
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One of the functionalities is the threat and vulnerability assessment phase that is mainly 
technical and is performed by information security specialists who are specifically trained 
in this area. "Analysis" differs from examination in that it refers to interpretation, by 
different members. It is recommended that the analysis team conduct a workshop to 
review the findings from the threat and vulnerability assessment once the results are 
established. 
Guidance: The studied methodologies provide guidelines and a structure for the user to 
follow. They do not elaborate on project and change management requirements 
adequately that are critically required within the process of information risk assessment 
adequately. While the exercise seems to be primarily a technical challenge, it is indeed 
more of an art in obtaining the collaboration of the individuals within the organization and 
making the changes required with the controls established to be more resilient to 
overcome security incidents. The proposed methodologies are limited in addressing the 
issue of change required in the organization to establish a risk aware culture. 
The methodologies are not detailed in providing tasks to demonstrate how to sustain 
sponsorship, keep the stakeholders engaged, foster a spirit of open communication and 
provide sufficient authority to the analysis team. Training and awareness is a critical 
element in risk recognition, not considered as a specific phase in the methodologies. 
Usability. This characteristic refers to the degree in which an information risk assessment 
methodology is able to expand its usefulness. An information risk assessment 
methodology is mostly used in a certain region, with respect to its original language, 
industry standards, local best practices and regulatory environment. While the Microsoft 
and IRAM frameworks are unique in providing features tailored to support technology 
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organizations, EBIOS and NIST are developed specifically for defense organizations, 
OCTAVE primarily developed for defense organization can be properly described as 
general in its application. OCTAVE and NIST are widely used in North America; IRAM 
is mostly used in UK and Europe; EBIOS in France and French speaking regions; 
CORAS in Norway, Sweeden and in some areas of Europe; Microsoft methodology in 
technology companies in US; IT Grundschutz, in Germany, Austria and the rest of 
Europe. OCTAVE, EBIOS, NIST are originally developed for defense industry, but have 
expanded their use over the years, in terms of industry. 
Consistency: Consistency in the definition and understanding of these concepts contribute 
significantly in eliminating confusion, with regards to selecting the appropriate 
methodology that is adaptable to the organization's needs. In seeking to identify common 
terms, it is useful to establish a common understanding of terms to enhance 
communication. The methodologies provide descriptions of the terms and some of them 
have a glossary. 
Tool Support: It is appropriate to note that the information risk assessment frameworks 
presented herein give little consideration to important features such as modeling and 
quantification of risks which impact the results and the quality of the process. Another 
issue is that the frameworks provided have electronic tools, but no automatic reporting 
capability, except the excel sheets or the other templates provided within the tool. Thus, 
there is a considerable administrative part that goes along the process of recording, 
reporting and keeping track of the records. CRAMM decreases this burden with its 
software. 
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The challenge with a software product is the time spent to effectively and efficiently use it 
during the process. The licensing costs, training time required for the tool and the support 
time for maintenance needs also to be considered in the project cost and schedule 
management, specifically for organizations conducting information risk analyses, for the 
first time with an accompanying tool. 
With respect to the set of shortcomings observed along the analysis in Chapter 2 and 
comparative study in Chapter 3, the new information risk assessment methodology should 
be seen from a perspective of improving project management and quality aspects with the 
major objective: present an integrated process in information risk evaluation. The other 
points can be considered as those common and essential in any information risk 
assessment process. 
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Chapter 4: Integrated Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the primary objective is to propose an integrated information risk 
assessment methodology developed with support of the literature review and comparative 
analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The intent is to present a new methodology in 
information risk assessment designed to: 
• Construct further on common practices related to the existing state of the art 
methodologies; 
• Incorporate the strengths of the reviewed methodologies; 
• Address the weaknesses of the reviewed methodologies; and 
• Propose new ideas to improve the state of the art on information risk assessment 
methodology. 
Most of the professionals in the information security field are focused in technical aspects 
in information security. This study brings a process centric approach that addresses the 
challenges in assessment of information security risks within the organization, through a 
structured methodology, based on principles defined. The research reported in this chapter 
is an effort to contribute to the state of the art information risk assessment methodologies. 
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It is not to create a comprehensive methodology designed to outperform the existing 
processes. In this respect, the characteristics of the information risk assessment 
methodology presented in this chapter are summarized first with its foundation named as 
principles and is followed with its phases. Phases are steps that the information risk 
analyst or the analysis team is required to take in a sequential manner. On the other hand, 
principles are a set of specific objectives that forms the foundation of the methodology, 
and that the information risk analyst or the analysis team is required to progressively 
achieve throughout the information risk assessment process. [15] 
4.2 Principles 
A principle represents a fundamental attribute or requirement of the information risk 
analysis that cannot be uniquely associated with a single phase. A principle is set and 
followed through the methodology, throughout its phases. Based on the following 
principles which we explain each in detail, we develop our methodology. Some of these 
principles apply to comparison frameworks of other security processes, such as in cyber-




















Figure 4-1: Principles of the Integrated Methodology 
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4.2.1 Iterativeness and Validation 
The iterativeness and validation principle stipulates that for each phase of the information 
risk assessment, results from the previous phases are considered as inputs. The proposed 
methodology has a control structure that permits feedback from phases together with the 
iteration of some of the steps when required. 
Validation is required throughout the process of risk assessment. In order to start a new 
phase in the risk assessment methodology validated results from the preceding process are 
required. Validation is also required for the sustainability of information risk assessments. 
It is necessary to introduce an ongoing program of validation to ensure that the security 
strategy and procedures set as a result of the information risk assessment are correctly 
followed and the results from the assessment are valid. Communication and knowledge 
transfer throughout the project also support validation mechanism. 
4.2.2 Computer Support 
An important feature of the proposed process is computer support for information risk 
assessment. It means that the process is implemented by using software or electronic 
worksheets or other tools. It is directed towards guiding the information risk analyst or 
the analysis team through the phases when conducting an information risk assessment. 
The methodology enables a database model to be established, with respect to the 
parameters and activities required in each phase. The model is to be user friendly and 
have automatic reporting capability to present data. 
4.2.3 Documentation 
The documentation principle stipulates that all activities executed within an information 
risk assessment must be fully documented. During the reporting and presentation phases, 
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documentation pertaining to the previous phases is assembled and compiled into a final 
report. It is important to maintain documentation regarding the review and results of the 
risk assessment as well as all approved preventive and corrective measures. All the 
documentation collected and created during the process is properly archived, in case of 
reference for future assessments. Documentation also serves as a tool for compliance 
with requirements of the regulatory bodies, as well as the third party auditors. 
4.2.4 Quality Assurance 
The quality assurance principle is integrated to ensure the consistent quality of all phases 
and tasks that are undertaken during an information risk assessment process. It is 
required to provide appropriate procedures and training in order to meet the requirements 
of control, accuracy, and reliability of the collected data during the information risk 
assessment. All phases require a quality assurance mechanism to monitor executed 
actions, control, and ensure their validity of the outputs. 
4.2.5 Change Management 
An important element in conducting an effective information risk assessment is change 
management plan. This principle is more relevant to risk management program, 
specifically in implementation of risk mitigation actions as countermeasures for identified 
risks. On the other hand, with respect to the fact that the assessment of information risks 
is the first step of the risk management program, it is important to consider the change 
vision in the first step. If the organization's culture incorporates information risk 
management within its daily operations, it is more likely to establish a successful risk 
management program. The vision for change provides direction on why the change 
initiative is being undertaken. Introducing new risks to the audience that they were 
68 
unaware requires managing the change effectively, throughout the risk assessment 
process. Thus, the objective is to design communication plan for change that ensures 
broad-based buy-in into information risk assessment project as a fundamental component. 
A meeting with senior management and interviews with stakeholders occurs to analyze 
their positions on impact of change in establishing a change management program. This 
information is used to recommend appropriate responses in the scheme of the project, 
specifically in defining the security strategy and countermeasures to the threats identified. 
At the end of the risk assessment process, responsibilities are assigned for each mitigation 
activity to implement the change to secure information assets of the organization. 
4.2.6 Communications Planning 
This principle stipulates the need to plan the communication throughout the information 
risk assessment process. Usually, a gap in communication exists between IT and the 
business within an organization. IT security managers are generally not in the top 
management ranks within an organization, yet is the owner of IT security risk assessment. 
The business owners are perceived of having only limited knowledge in security, but 
could cause great threat potential due to their inadequate knowledge, by the majority of IT 
staff. 
In order to address the communication issues and sustain commitment to the process and 
upper management support, the owner of the IT risk assessment project is selected from 
the business side of the organization, preferably a person with a full understanding of 
challenges of information security. Business needs to own the IT risk assessment project 
and thus, the risk management process that takes place once the assessment is completed. 
Any, or a combination, of the techniques can be used in gathering information relevant to 
69 
an information asset. One of them is to utilize questionnaires to collect relevant 
information on the present controls of the asset. The questionnaire can also be used 
during work-shops or interviews. Interviews conducted with business and IT staff also 
allows useful information to be gathered. Site visits allow identifying the physical 
vulnerabilities and possible threat scenarios. Review of policy documentation, system 
user guides, procedures system administrators must adhere are other ways of gathering 
information. 
4.2.7 Supply Chain Management 
Present methodologies focus directly to the critical information assets of the organization, 
while our process-centric methodology focuses on the critical processes of the 
organization. This helps to produce more viable results, because most of the 
organizations who undertake information security risk assessment have a series of 
processes interlinked and an infrastructure connecting the information required within 
these processes. Information flows between various departments within the organization 
as well as to and from the third party suppliers outside the organization. The 
interdependence between the partners and the organization increases with respect to 
effective relationships [41]. The success of the business relationships between these 
parties is achieved through mutual trust gained through open communication. The 
exchange of information of the different parties within the operating business 
environment brings additional risks that need to be considered in the information security 
risk assessment. 
An effective conflict resolution mechanism is highly important to strengthen the supply 
chain relationship. The presence of flexibility, cooperation and trust are basis to the 
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relationship. Specifically, commitment of top management is crucial for the success. 
Good organizational arrangements are necessary for information sharing. Inadequate 
sharing of information breaks the supply chain partnerships. Communications and change 
management principles support the concepts in supply chain. The analysis team needs to 
understand how supply chain dynamics work within an organization which will directly 
impact the risk portfolio, as well as development of the protection strategy, risk mitigation 
plans and naturally success of the security program in the organization. 
4.2.7 Knowledge Transfer 
There is a need to manage knowledge transfer while conducting the information risk 
assessment. One of the objectives of the information risk assessment is to increase 
information security awareness within the organization. In order to measure the level of 
security understanding in the organization, a security survey can be conducted. The 
questionnaire, based on the best practices of an internationally recognized standard needs 
to be customized to integrate specific compliance requirements of the organization. 
Transferring the knowledge in information security to participants during the process also 
ensures higher quality, sustainability and continuity of efforts, upon completion of the 
information risk assessment. The way to transfer knowledge throughout the risk 
assessment process is by working closely with the risk assessment participants during and 
after the risk assessment, involving them to ensure that all pertinent knowledge is 
transferred to relevant staff. 
4.2.8 Performance Management and Continuous Improvement 
Continuous improvement to attain best practices in information security is part of the 
new methodology. Breakthrough improvement referring to discontinuous change is not 
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preferred as we are looking for gradual, continuous improvement that does not require the 
organization to stretch to the point of functioning in a completely different way. What we 
are looking for is incremental improvement actions, applied throughout the risk 
assessment process as awareness of the participants increases and unknown risks are 
identified. Many organizations are familiar with the concept of continuous improvement 
through their quality management program. The challenge of the new methodology is to 
implement the similar way of thinking to the information security risk assessment 
process. 
Continuous assurance and monitoring is done throughout the process. The priority is to 
monitor the high risk areas. Risk related activities that have high incidence of change 
need to be monitored. While the change can be sudden, gradual or persistent, gradual 
change is what we are targeting throughout the process. A potential failure of the change 
management program is when the changes are implemented or imposed without regard to 
the risks involved, and thus monitoring and validation is necessary in every step to ensure 
the change is gradual and could be sustained. Performance measurement is part of the 
validation mechanism. There are certain criteria that should be watched out for, 
concerning performance indicators, which we discuss in our case study. 
4.3 Phases 
Based on the principles covered above, we develop the methodology and display the 
activities or tasks that need to be executed during an information risk assessment process, 
phase by phase, in a sequential structure, as shown in the following diagram. 
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Figure 4-2: Phases of the Integrated Methodology 
From hereon, at the beginning of each phase, we provide a description of that phase, 
emphasizing what it brings to the integrated methodology different from that of the 
existing methodologies. We state the objectives of the phase. A schematic diagram 
demonstrates the activities to be conducted step by step, in each phase. We explain each 
activity, in sequence. At the end of each phase, we summarize the inputs that are 
required and outputs that are produced. 
4.3.1 Identify and Scope 
Description: The first step in an information risk assessment undertaking is to clearly 
understand the business objectives of the organization defining the processes that are 
critical for the organization to achieve its objectives and the relationship of these 
processes to the information assets. Once the information assets are identified, we start 
collecting information on the threats that face the assets. This sets the scope of the 
information risk assessment. The highlights of the first phase that provide improved 
functionality, compared to the existing methodologies are: 
• Process centric assessment based on supply chain principles; and 
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• Scoping with clear definition of time, budget and resource commitment; based on 
the project management practices; 
Objectives: To obtain a general understanding of the business and to define what is 
important to the business and to set the scope. Prepare the project plan and have it 
approved. 
Activities: The following activities, illustrated in the diagram, take place in Phase 1. 
PHASE 1 I 
Identify and Scope I 





Project Plan t t 
Identify Critical 
Processes 












Figure 4-3: Phase 1 Activities 
1. Conduct Planning Session: First, we organize a session with stakeholders who are 
at the upper levels of management. Sponsorship for the information risk assessment 
initiative is part of the agenda for the meeting. In the working session, we explain the 
needs and expected benefits to conduct an information risk assessment. We target to 
understand how much of uncertainty stakeholders are willing to expect as an input in our 
scoping. The risk tolerance for the organization is discussed, in consult with the upper 
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management. This is further enhanced by defining the perimeters of "high", "medium" 
and "low" risk areas in the risk portfolio diagram discussed in Phase 5. 
We define the analysis team to undertake implementation of the methodology in the 
organization. The members of the team are selected experts in their own functions, both 
from business, and information technology side of the organization. 
2. Prepare Project Plan: Once the management session is executed and the team is 
defined, we draft a project management plan. The project management plan consists of 
the activities step by step that are required to be conducted throughout the assessment. 
Activity durations are matched with the amount of time required from the resources, 
which is used to derive the budget of the project. The cost, schedule and resource plan of 
the project is presented for management approval. In preparation of the project plan, we 
suggest the user refer to the best practices established by Project Management Institute 
(PMI) which recognizes five basic process groups and nine knowledge areas typical of 
almost all projects. The basic concepts are applicable to projects and programs. The five 
basic process groups are initiation, planning, execution, control and closing which is 








Figure 4-4: Process Groups, Project Management Institute 
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The nine knowledge areas are of PMI [45] are (1) Project Integration Management, (2) 
Project Scope Management, (3) Project Time Management, (4) Project Cost Management, 
(5) Project Quality Management, (6) Project Human Resource Management, (7) Project 
Communications Management, (8) Project Risk Management, and (9) Project 
Procurement Management. 
Approved project plans include approved resource planning, activity planning, critical 
milestones, project schedule, project cost, project risk planning, project communications 
planning, change management. Upon presentation of the project plan with project 
schedule and budget, management now has the tools to make an informed decision to 
undertake information security risk assessment. At this point, we ask for commitment 
from the management and them to sign off on the project plan. 
3. Identify critical processes: Once the budget is approved, we start the information risk 
assessment process, with the identification of business processes and assets. Organization 
charts help us to identify the departments and their relevant directors, managers and staff 
members. Process diagrams show the inputs and outputs of each process and their 
dependant processes. In selection of the critical processes, the analysis team needs to 
review the list of main business processes, in the organization. For each applicable main 
process, the inter-relations between other processes and assets are determined. 
4. High Level Impact Assessment: For each main process, its criticality to the business 
is assessed in case an incident occurs. The magnitude of the impact on the organization 
needs to be determined if the processes are accessed or performed by unauthorized 
people, if the resources-assets are modified without authorization or lost, destroyed, 
cannot be performed due to an interruption impacting their availability. 
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An impact value from "High" to "Low" is assigned for each applicable scenario, 
qualifying the assessment with comments. Then, the most critical processes which have 
the highest impact, on the organization are selected. 
5. Identify critical assets: Inputs, processing assets and outputs are defined for each 
critical process selected in order to select the top critical assets. Inputs are what people 
need or use to perform their jobs to start the process, processing assets are what people 
require to perform the process, and the outputs are the assets people produce as a result of 
conducting a process. The reason for selecting each critical resource-asset is documented. 
6. Identify critical people: The knowledge and skills of the critical people required for 
each critical process is documented by considering the special skills or knowledge which 
would be difficult to replace and yet vital to the organization. For each critical 
information asset, users, the information owner and the information custodian must be 
determined, by determined. 
The "information owner" is usually the manager of the department or the business unit, 
who is responsible for the creation of information. Information owners are also 
responsible to ensure information classification is in place and current, as well as the 
access rights to the information. 
The "information custodian" is the authority assigned by the information owner who has 
the expertise to manage the technical aspects of the information includes back ups, 
recovery, implementation of access rights, control and monitoring. 
7. Identify the Security Requirements: The security requirements for each critical 
resource-asset are determined from the categories of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. One asset may have more than one security requirement critical to protect. 
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Inputs of Phase 1: 
• Expected benefits of information risk assessment to the organization; 
• Presentation of the information risk assessment methodology; 
• Specific security needs of the organization; 
• Concerns and objectives of the upper management; 
• List of business processes of the organization, process diagrams, procedures; 
• List of resources - assets of the organization; and 
• Organizational chart. 
Outputs of Phase 1: 
• Analysis team members are identified; 
• Project plan is approved by management; 
• Critical business processes are identified; 
• Critical resources- assets of the processes are selected, specifying the reasons roles 
and responsibilities related to the asset; and 
• Information security requirements of the critical resources - assets are identified. 
4.3.2 Evaluate Security Practices 
Description: This phase is dedicated to collecting relevant data from the organization in 
order to understand the control structure and the present security practices applied in the 
organization. 
The highlights of the second phase are: 
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Analysis of the control structure of the organization, from an audit perspective; 
• Measuring the level of security in the organization, with specific questions 
relevant to the organization's security objectives. 
Objectives: To understand business and security objectives. To determine the level of 
maturity in security within the organization and the level of compliance to the information 
security best practices. 
Activities: The following activities, illustrated in the diagram take place in Phase 2. 
1 
PHASE 2 















Figure 4-5: Phase 2 Activities 
1. Review security policy and procedures: We obtain security policy and procedures, as 
well present controls. Security policy and related information security procedures help 
us to identify the objectives stated by the management and what staff members within the 
organization are required to respect. We then organize an information gathering session 
with the selected participants of the organization. 
2. Prepare Security Practice Survey: A security practice survey enables an analysis team 
to evaluate the extent to which security practices are reflected in the way the business 
manages security. Best practices in information security are present in the existing 
methodologies presented in Chapter 3; OCTAVE, IRAM, IT Grundschutz, and the 
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international standard ISO 17799. The organization undertaking information risk 
assessment exercise must develop a proprietary information security survey building on 
the best practices in the industry, addressing specific security objectives and security 
requirements of the organization based on its own unique operating environment. The 
security practice areas must be categorized and specific questions pertaining to each 
security practice area must be created as part of the survey preparation. 
One categorization could potentially be to divide security practices into strategic and 
operational, as done in OCTAVE. Strategic security practices are those that focus on 
organizational issues at the policy level. They include business-related issues as well as 
issues that require business-wide plans and participation can be summarized as [9]: 
• Security Awareness and Training; 
• Security Strategy; 
• Security Management; 
• Security Policies and Regulations; 
• People; 
• Collaborative Security Management; and 
• Contingency Planning/Disaster Recovery. 
Operational security practices are more technical and focused to the practice area of 
information technology staff. They focus on technology-related issues. They include 
issues related to how people use and protect technology in their daily operational 
environment. The operational security practices can be summarized in the following 
categories [9]: 
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• Physical Access Control; 
• Monitoring and Auditing Physical Security; 
• System and Network Management; 
• Monitoring and Auditing IT Security; 
• Authentication and Authorization; 
• Vulnerability Management; 
• Encryption; 
• Security Architecture and Design; and 
• Incident Management. 
While the above categories present an example of how to classify best practices in 
information security; an internationally recognized standard, ISO 17799 [40] uses a 
similar list as best practices in information security. An organization uses best practices 
that are most relevant to its requirements as a starting point, and then tailors them 
according to the needs and prerequisites of the control environment it is operating in. 
3. Conduct Security Practice Survey: The survey can be conducted within a working 
session with the participants or in one-to-one interviews, or can be distributed to the 
participants for them to respond individually. In completion of the survey, what the 
business currently doing well in a specific security area and not doing so well need to be 
considered. In response to their knowledge of a security practice area, the participants 
select between "Yes", "Yes, but not effective", "No" and "Do not know". According to 
the findings from the security survey analysis, the analysis team determines the status of 
each security practice area question, by one of the following choices: 
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• Green - The application of security practices in the organization is satisfactory; 
• Yellow - The application of security practices in the organization needs some 
improvement; and 
• Red - The application of security practices in the organization needs significant 
amount of improvement. 
Inputs of Phase 2: 
• Security policy and procedures; 
• Present controls in the organization; and 
• Security best practices survey questions. 
Outputs of Phase 2: 
• Level of maturity in security awareness in the organization; 
• Degree of compliance to the best practices is determined; and 
• Areas of weaknesses in security practices. 
4.3.3 Characterize Threats 
Description: At this phase, a team composed of participants from business and IT conduct 
a detailed information risk assessment. The team focuses on the critical processes and 
their related assets identified in the first phase. The team starts by identifying the threat 
sources that have a potential to produce such threats. The team also documents the 
history of threat occurrences. The highlight of the third phase is to characterize threats 
based on the potentiality, considering the likelihood, strength of the motive of an actor, as 
well as the past history of occurrence. 
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Objectives: To identify threats, actors and their motives. To document the history of the 
threat scenarios occurred in the past. 
Activities: The following activities, illustrated in the diagram, take place in Phase 3. 
PHASE 3 
Characterize Threats 











Figure 4-6: Phase 3 Activities 
1. Determine Threat Sources: A threat profile is defined in OCTAVE as, a structured 
way of presenting a range of threats to a critical asset. Threats in the profile are grouped 
according to the source of the threat. Present methodologies often have a generic threat 
profile which is a catalog of threats containing a range of potential threats under 
consideration. IT Grundschutz [29] has a detailed catalog of threats which consists of 
possible threats that may be applicable to the organization. The generic threat profile is a 
starting point for creating a unique threat profile for each critical asset, according to their 
use in a specific organization. 
Threat scenarios are characterized by their related asset, by the people who may violate 
the security, by the access method of the people and their motive. The outcome of the 
threat is the end result, causing disclosure, modification, destruction or interruption by 
violating one or more of the security requirements of an asset. 
Each critical asset, whether it is an application, database, a system or information has a 
unique threat profile that needs to be addressed by the participants of the information risk 
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assessment. One of the following categories or a combination of more than one may be 
threat sources: 
• People: The types of threats involving people require direct action by a person 
and can be performed deliberately or accidentally. A system interruption due to 
natural causes does not fit into this category. 
• Network access: The threats in this category are network-based threats to the 
organization's critical assets. 
• Physical access: The threats in this category are physical threats to the 
organization's critical assets. 
• Natural Causes: The threats in this category are problems that do not directly 
involve human actors. 
• Utility Causes: The threats in this category are problems related to the third party 
suppliers, like telephone companies or utilities, which ultimately impact the 
operation. 
2. Develop Threat Scenarios: Threats are represented visually in a structure using the 
categories of threat sources above. Each critical asset has a different threat profile. All 
threat scenarios must be discussed during the assessment, regardless of their impact, 
probability or the present controls on them. This is extremely important as probability of 
event occurrences may change and impacts may vary, as well as control adequacy may 
not be accessed correctly. 
3. Define Actors and Motives: In determining the actors, outsiders and insiders are 
considered in terms of threat sources, as insiders are the dominant cause of security 
84 
breaches. Their access methods to the valuable asset, either via network or via physical 
means needs to be considered. The actor's motive and the strengths of the motive are 
identified. The ranking of actor's motive became more of a concern, with respect to the 
increase in terrorism threats. In order to define the actor's motive, the options from 
"High" to "Low" must be considered: 
• High - The actor has defined goals, specifically targeting the critical asset; and 
• Low- The actor does not have specific goals, is targeting any asset that can be 
attacked easily. 
4. Examine history of incidents: In reference to the threat scenarios developed, the 
incident history is reviewed, to identify if and how frequently the threat has occurred in 
the past. This can be done by reviewing any objective data available, such as documented 
incident data, system logs or by obtaining subjective data, based on interviews, from what 
people recall. 
Inputs of Phase 3: 
• Types of threats and sources; and 
• Critical assets and their security requirements identified. 
Outputs of Phase 3: 
• Selected types of threats for each critical asset; 
• Determination of actors and their motives for the relevant threat scenarios; and 
• Frequency of occurrence for selected threats and accuracy of data. 
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4.3.4 Identify Vulnerabilities 
Description: In this phase, for each critical asset identified the analysis team determines 
vulnerabilities. The highlight of Phase 4 that provides improved functionality, compared 
to the existing methodologies is assessing physical vulnerabilities in addition to electronic 
vulnerabilities. 
Electronic vulnerability assessment focuses on the vulnerabilities exposed through the 
network access paths, which are the ways in which systems, devices, information, or 
services can be accessed via an organization's network. Physical vulnerability assessment 
focuses on the vulnerabilities exposed through the physical access paths where the critical 
information of the organization resides. 
Objective: To examine access paths (electronic and physical) to critical components of 
the asset or system of interest. 






Figure 4.3 -7: Phase 4 Activities 
1. Network Vulnerability Assessment: We start by examining the access paths, 
conducting a vulnerability assessment on the network. In terms of access paths, we first 
consider the interfaces for access used to transmit information and applications from the 




information on the system of interest. The access points and storage locations are 
analyzed. The analysis team determines which components people use to access the 
system of interest. The options include on-site workstations, laptops, or wireless 
components, home/external workstations and others. 
We then compare the list of electronic components and access paths identified for the 
specific critical asset to other critical assets. The classes of components related to one or 
more critical assets are considered critical. Next, we identify the party responsible for 
maintaining and securing each class of components. The party responsible for 
maintaining and securing each class of electronic components must be identified. 
We determine how well each class of components is currently protected. The extent of 
confidence is indicated, when maintaining each class of components in reference to the 
following scale: 
• Very much -The objective data is available; 
• Somewhat - A limited amount of objective data related to the estimate is available; 
• Not at all - Little objective data related to the estimate is available; and 
• Don't Know - There is not adequate expertise to make the estimate. 
2. Physical Vulnerability Assessment: In this activity, we focus on the vulnerabilities exposed 
through the physical access paths where the critical information of the organization 
resides. The information usually resides in the main building of the organization, in the 
computer room and other defined locations. During physical vulnerability assessment, 
the electric power supply system, fire protection system, environmental control systems 
such as air conditioning, water protection, building entry surveillance are the areas in 
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scope of the review. Any potential weaknesses in these areas that may impact the security 
of the critical information in the organization are identified and documented. 
Specific control measures are taken for the computer room. During the physical 
vulnerability assessment, the following measures are reviewed: 
• If access to the computer room or the data centre is restricted to authorized 
personnel with a security access card; 
• If security cameras are installed that helps to monitor traffic to and from the 
data centre; 
• If the door alarms to selected restricted areas are functional; 
• The operation of uninterrupted power supply (UPS) in the computer room; 
• Sensors for temperature and humidity control; 
• Smoke detectors and fire prevention equipment; and 
• Visitors are authorized for restricted areas by the appropriate member of 
management and are accompanied by internal staff. 
Inputs of Phase 4: 
• Critical systems of interest; and 
• List of components for storage of data from the system of interest; 
Outputs of Phase 4: 
• Selected key class components of critical systems of interest; 
• Selected access paths; 
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• List of components for storage of data; 
• Responsible for key class components; 
• Extent of security protection for each key class component; and 
• The existing physical controls for information security and vulnerabilities. 
4.3.5 Analyze Risks 
Description: This phase is to determine and analyze risks to the organization's 
information security. During this phase, the analysis team identifies risks to the 
organization's critical assets and develops the risk portfolio for the information security 
risks of the organization. The highlights of Phase 5 that provide improved techniques, 
compared to the existing methodologies are: 
• Identification of residual risks, based on the controls established and the inherent 
risks through risk portfolio; and 
• Impact rating, control grading, and risk tolerance defined based on the 
organization's goals and objectives. 
Objectives: To identify risks based on the threats, impacts and likelihoods. To determine 
information risk profile for an organization, deriving the residual risk upon analysis of the 
inherent risks and the controls. 
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Figure 4-8: Phase 5 Activities 
1. Establish an Understanding of Risk: In this step, we establish the understanding for 
risk, which is the possibility of suffering harm or loss, as defined in OCTAVE. NIST SP 
800-30 [50] defines risk as "a function of the likelihood of a given threat source 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse 
event on the organization". In information security, the term risk refers to a situation an 
undesirable outcome violating the information security requirements of an organization's 
critical asset, resulting in a negative impact or consequence. An information risk is 
composed of: 
• an incident 
• uncertainty 
• a consequence 
In information security, the basic event is a security threat. Uncertainty is embodied in 
much of the information gathered during the evaluation. There is uncertainty surrounding 
whether a threat will occur and whether the organization is sufficiently protected against 
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the threat. Uncertainty is often represented using likelihood of occurrence, or probability. 
The consequence that ultimately matters in information security risk is the resulting 
impact on the organization due to a threat occurrence. Impact describes how an 
organization might be affected based on the threat outcomes. 
2. Develop Likelihood Criteria: We first establish the criteria for the likelihood of an 
incident to occur, defined by a set of evaluation criteria that set definitions for likelihood 
values. These criteria are divided from high to low measures of threats' likelihood by 
considering a range of frequencies, such as daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-
annually, once per year, once every two years, once every five years, once every ten years 
and above. The goal is to define probability measures based on how often threats are 
likely to occur: 
• the types of threats to critical assets; 
• how often each threat has occurred in the past (history); 
• the vulnerabilities present in the system and infrastructure; and 
• any additional relevant information recorded. 
3. Develop Impact Criteria: Impact is directly linked to the organization's mission and 
business objectives. In creating impact evaluation criteria for the organization, types of 
impacts are considered, starting with those to the strategic goals of the organization, the 
customer confidence, health and safety, legal penalties and publicity. Tangible impacts, 
such as those to the organization's financial state, to the productivity and to other factors 
specific to the organization's operating environment are also considered. 
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We then establish the impact criteria via a facilitated discussion with management. When 
determining the impact severity levels relative to the organization, for the impact types 
described above, the impact severity is defined from high to low. 
4. Review previous notes: Before conducting the rest of the activities for risk analysis, we 
review any notes and recommendations recorded during the previous processes. These 
notes and recommendations are important to the next activities conducted. The items in 
the scope of the review include threats to the critical assets, threat characteristics; such as 
threat actors, motive, incident history and the security requirements of the critical asset. 
5. Determine Impacts: Each impact area is assigned an impact measure from "High" to 
"Low", based on the impact criteria set in the earlier step. When assigning the impact 
measures the factors defined in Phases 3 and 4 are considered. They are the motive for 
deliberate actions by human actors, the summary of network infrastructure vulnerabilities, 
physical infrastructure vulnerabilities and the contextual information about threat actors. 
6. Determine Likelihoods: Similar to the likelihood criteria, the estimate of any threat 
occurrence must be adjusted in reference from "High" to "Low" for the likelihoods. In 
assigning likelihood estimates, the accuracy of historic data, the person's confidence in 
the estimate of motive strength, comprehensiveness of the evaluation of the network and 
physical infrastructure vulnerabilities are to be considered. 
7. Develop Risk Profile: Risk is the product of its impact and likelihood. For known threats, 
the risk level is estimated and noted on the risk profile chart, based on its impact and 
likelihood. The chart is an easy to review visual product used to facilitate a discussion. 
The high risk areas composed of high impact severity and likelihood of occurrence are 
shown in "red". The medium risk areas are highlighted in "yellow" and the low risk areas 
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are highlighted in "green". 
Impact 3 
Me (limn Risk Area 
Likelihood 
Figure 4.3 -9: Graphical Presentation of the Risks 
Upon determining the organization's risk profile, organization's control structure is 
reviewed, based on the vulnerability analysis performed previously. If an identified risk 
shifts to a lower degree of severity, with respect to the present control, it must be 
identified. The remaining residual risk is discussed. 
Inputs of Phase 5: 
• Critical Assets; 
• Threats identified for each asset in scope; 
• Motive for actions by human actors; 
• Summary of computing infrastructure vulnerabilities for network threats; 
• Summary of physical infrastructure vulnerabilities for physical threats; and 
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• Contextual information about threat actors. 
Outputs of Phase 5: 
• Impact criteria for the organization defined; 
• Impact measures are established; 
• Probability measures are established; 
• Each threat is assigned with a probability and impact; 
• Prioritized risk portfolio of the organization; and 
• Controls established and residual risks. 
4.3.6 Develop Security Strategy and Mitigation Plans 
Description: The success of the implementation of a risk treatment plan requires an 
effective management system that specifies actions and methods, assigns responsibilities 
and accountabilities for actions and monitors them against the specified performance 
criteria. 
The highlights of this phase are the communication and change management discussed as 
principles. They must be present as an ongoing effort throughout the risk assessment to 
produce viable results, while they become more important in this phase, where plans to 
manage risks are developed to be implemented. 
A method utilized is gap analysis in consult with security objectives is performed to 
define mitigation approaches to identified gaps in security. 
Objectives: To determine and to select the risk treatment options for the information risks 
identified. 
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Activities: The following activities, illustrated in the diagram, take place in Phase 6. 
PHASE 6 




















Figure 4.3-10: Phase 6 Activities 
1. Describe Current Security Protection Strategies: Security best practices are available 
in each information risk assessment methodology, as explained in the earlier step 
"Evaluation of Security Practices". Each security practice area has multiple 
characteristics that must be addressed. The following diagram depicts the characteristics 































Figure 4.3-11: Example of a Security Practice 
Each strategic security practice area has a unique set of characteristics. The protection 
strategy describes the processes used to perform activities in each security practice area, 
which is the target control strategy of the organization. The extent to which processes are 
formally defined is explored. 
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The status on the security practices survey indicates how well the analysis team believes 
its organization is performing in each area. An organization could be performing very 
well in an area, but have very informal processes. Likewise, an organization could have 
significant room for improvement despite having very formal policies and procedures. 
The organization also may be over controlling in some areas, and under controlling in the 
others. The gap analysis is conducted where each security practice area is assessed, 
taking into consideration the following factors, in a security practice. 
• Responsibility: This characteristic depicts the responsible person for 
completing a set of specified tasks for the security practice area, to which accountability 
is assigned. This characteristic also defines whether accountability for each task rests 
with people in the organization, or with the third parties, or with a combination of people 
in the organization as well as third parties. 
• Procedures: The Procedures are documented within description of the extent 
of which an operational security practice area is formally defined. 
• Training: The Training characteristic defines the approach for building 
analysis team's skills and the participants' skills in a practice area. 
• Verification: The Verification characteristic defines the degree to which each 
third party complies with the requirements for an operational security practice area. 
For each security practice area, the respondent considers who is currently responsible for 
completing each task in this operational security practice area. If the responsibility 
resides with the people in the organization, a third party or a combination of people in the 
organization and one or more third parties. 
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2. Select Mitigation Approach: Mitigation approach is how an organization intends to 
address a risk. An organization has the following options for each risk: accept, mitigate, 
or defer which can be defined as follows: 
• Accept - a decision made during risk analysis to take no action to address a risk 
and to accept the consequences should the risk occur. Risks that are accepted 
typically have a low impact on an organization. 
• Mitigate - a decision made during risk analysis to address a risk by 
implementing activities designed to counter the underlying threat. Risks that are 
mitigated typically have a high impact on an organization. 
• Defer - a situation where a risk is neither accepted nor mitigated. The impact on 
the organization due to a deferred risk is above a minimal threshold, but not so 
large as to be an immediate priority. Deferred risks are watched and re-evaluated at 
some point in the future. 
The mitigation area is a security practice area that is designated to be improved in order to 
mitigate one or more of an organization's security risks. The decision to accept a risk, to 
mitigate it, or to defer the decision is based on a number of factors, impact value is often 
the primary driver when making the decision. Likelihood is also used to determine which 
risks need to be mitigated first. 
Unfortunately, there is no set decision-making process that applies in all circumstances. 
The information risk profile created for an organization is a decision support tool. It 
presents threats, impact values for multiple impact areas, likelihood values, and the 
statuses of the security practice areas, illustrating a picture of the risks affecting that 
critical asset. An analysis team uses the risk profile to support the mitigation decisions 
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that it makes. The approach to best suit the analysis team's preferences as well as the 
organization's accepted practices is selected, as there is no single approach for analyzing 
the information that is recorded throughout the evaluation. 
All information recorded throughout the evaluation is reviewed and specific attention is 
paid to any recommendations that are made regarding potential mitigation activities. It 
must be ensured that the review of all recorded information during the evaluation is 
completed, before selecting mitigation approaches. 
3. Review risks to the critical assets: In the work-session, the decision makers need to 
consider which risks need to be mitigated, accepted or deferred. Selecting too many areas 
will likely overwhelm the process of mitigation planning. Some risks will not be 
accepted nor mitigated, due to the potential impacts too low enough to accept, nor large 
enough to be designated as a current mitigation priority. These risks are deferred. 
Deferred risks are watched and re-evaluated at some point in the future. The relevant 
security practice areas are selected as mitigation areas. Any constraints in resources or 
funding are considered, when making the selections. 
4. Design Risk Mitigation Plans: Risk mitigation plans are often linked to the 
organization's survivability. They are generally designed to reduce the risks could prevent 
an organization from achieving its mission by addressing the underlying threats. A 
mitigation activity can address threats in one or more of the following ways: 
• Recognize threats as they occur; 
• Resist threats to prevent them from occurring; and 
• Recover from threats after they occur. 
Risk mitigation plans comprise the following elements: 
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• mitigation activity - defines the activities to be implemented in a security 
practice area; 
• responsibility - identifies who must be involved in implementing each activity; 
and 
• requirements - any support that will be needed when implementing each 
mitigation activity. 
Risk mitigation plans can trigger a change in the organization's protection strategy, while 
other activities do not create a major change, but only improve how the current protection 
strategy is implemented. It is identified if the mitigation activity causes a change in the 
organization's present protection strategy, which characteristics in the security practice 
area would be affected, and which factors is the change driven by. 
The activities that will produce the protection strategy are identified and documented in 
the mitigation plan for the appropriate security practice area. For each of the action 
items, one must specify a description of the action, responsibility for completing the 
action, and a term or a date for completing the action. 
Inputs of Phase 6: 
• Prioritized Risk Portfolio of the organization; 
• Countermeasures against risks. 
Outputs of Phase 6: 
• Gap Analysis; 
• Security Protection Strategy; 
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• Mitigated Risks; and 
• Deferred Risks. 
This concludes our information risk assessment process. Periodic reviews are required in 
order to monitor and control the improvement in information security maturity of the 
organization. The control and monitoring phases are considered as part of risk 
management. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The proposed methodology provides improved usability by its phase approach, where 
each activity is mapped. These activities are also demonstrated in the next section 
through the case study to provide a better understanding to the user, decreasing the need 
for specialized training. 
Phase 1 provides improved functionality and guidance, in consult with project 
management principles. The process is time and cost bounded providing decision 
making criteria for the management prior to committing to the process. Schedule, 
resource and budget planning helps to achieve improved scoping. 
The methodology is process centric, compared to system focus of the existing 
methodologies. We start by identification of the critical business processes for the 
organization in Phase 1. Based on the inputs and processing assets required for these 
processes, the critical information assets of the organization are defined. The 
dependencies of processes and their related information are taken into consideration with 
respect to the supply chain principle. 
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Phase 2 assesses the organization's information security maturity level, analyzing the 
present control structure from an audit perspective. The development of a security survey 
questionnaire that is specific to the organization improves the knowledge in security of 
the participants. The specialized training need is less, while an understanding of risk is 
promoted at every level within the organization that lead to more viable results. 
In characterization of the threats in Phase 3, the potentiality of a threat and strength of the 
motive are considered as well as the past history. 
Physical vulnerability analysis is provided displaying physical methods to access the 
critical information assets, as well as the electronic vulnerability assessment, in Phase 4. 
Phase 5 introduces improved techniques by presentation of risk portfolio, deriving 
residual risks, based on the analysis of the inherent risks and the present controls. Impact 
types, severities and control scale are determined with respect to the organization's 
operating environment. 
By employing change management principles, in Phase 6 more viable security strategies 
and risk mitigation plans are initiated and sustained. 
The secondary findings of the methodology can be summarized as follows: 
Communications planning, performance management and continuous improvement 
principles improve the management and the quality of the information risk assessment 
process and help to produce more viable results for the organization. 
Results from a phase are validated through multiple team members by the analysis team 
prior to the start of a new phase, enabling control, accuracy and reliability of the collected 
data, helping to ensure quality. 
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Documented results support for internal verification as well as external third party audits 
and compliance to the regulatory bodies. 
Quality assurance principles foster an environment of continuous improvement and 
performance management of the project, while the viable results are sustained through 
knowledge transfer, communications and change management principles. 
102 
Chapter 5: Case Study 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the proposed methodology presented in Chapter 4, this section is dedicated to 
case study. The tools and methods that relate to each of the principles in developing the 
proposed methodology are embodied within the case study. Phases and activities 
described in the previous chapter are followed, step by step, adapted to the operating 
environment of the organization. 
5.2 Case Study 
From here on, we present our case study in information risk assessment, phase by phase, 
in accordance to the steps of the proposed methodology explained in Chapter 4. The case 
study is a virtual one, because the results of the information risk assessment exercise is 
highly confidential for an organization and shall be distributed with restriction and not be 
shared in public under any circumstances. In order to demonstrate how the phases of the 
methodology are implemented, we used samples of processes and their associated 
information assets, created sample threat scenarios, a sample risk profile, presented results 
of gap analysis and provided recommendations based on the findings from the 
information risk assessment. 
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The methodology is customized according to the requirements of a large organization, 
operating in the service industry leading to slight variations in steps, between the 
methodology and case study. This is a general practice as each organization's operating 
environment is unique. 
5.2.1 Identify and Scope 
In the first phase, we scope the information risk assessment, by understanding what is 
critical to the organization's information security well being. A planning session with 
upper management is first conducted. A brief explanation on the methodology is made 
explaining the scope and objectives. We obtain management's commitment to the project. 
Before they select the analysis team members for the project, we provide training, by a 
walkthrough of the process, through a schematic diagram. This gives them an 
understanding of our methodology and what an information risk assessment involves. We 
conduct Phase 1, based on the steps of the methodology and Phase 2 within a 3 hours 
period, with the management team. 




1 Project Planning 
2 Risk Assessment 
3: Report Findings 
Task Name 
Plan Project and Conduct 
Management Session 
Identity and Scope 
- Conduct Work-shops 
- Interview selected staff 
Evaluate Security Practices 
Characterize Threats 
Identify Vulnerabilities 
Identily and Analyze Risks 
Develop Security Strategy and 
Mitigation Plans 
Final Write-Up 
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Figure 5.2-1: Project Timeline 
The project start date is set as the 31st of March within duration of six weeks, as shown on 
the project schedule, with the dates of completion for each phase. The project milestones, 
like conducting the project launch meeting, completion of security strategy and mitigation 
plans are noted on the project schedule. Resource plans are prepared, based on the project 
schedule; in our case study for an analysis team of five. The total project budget for the 
process is also estimated, according to the hourly rates of the staff. The cost, schedule 
and resource plan of the project are presented for management approval. At this point, 
we ask for commitment from management. The project plan is signed off. Once the 
budget is approved, we start with the information risk assessment process by identifying 
the business processes and assets. 
From a review of the processes in the organization, the two critical processes are 
identified as "the execution of projects" and "bid preparation", in which the "Design 
Department" and "Project Department" are actively involved. In the example below, 
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participants from these departments determine the critical information assets. Each asset 











Tool for Risk Analysis 
Software for Project 
Scheduling 
Cost Estimation software 
Modeling application 
Auto Cad License 

















Table 5-1: Asset Identification 
The critical assets are distinguished whether they are "inputs", "processing assets" or 
"outputs". Their impact severities are defined from "High" to "Low" for the following 
threat scenarios which all violate one or more security requirements of the asset. 
• "access by unauthorized people"; 
• "modification without authorization"; and 
• "loss and destruction" and "interruption". 
Assets 
Inputs 
Resume Bank (Purpose of use: in 
proposal responses to bid for 
projects) 
References - client references from 
previous projects (Purpose of use: 
in proposal) 



























Technical Package — 
Response to Proposal 
Pricing Package — 
Response to Proposal 






























Table 5-3: High Level Impact Table -for Processing Assets and Outputs 
From the table above, we conclude that for the majority of asset availability is the most 
critical security requirement. This is due to the nature of the business in proposal 
preparation, where the team works against a tight deadline. It is unlikely to submit the 
proposal response on time, in case of asset and resource unavailability. The modification 
of the data can cause deviations in the technical package, as well as in the pricing 
package, such as errors in design and cost estimates. A security breach is access of 
unauthorized people to the "Resume Bank" leading to the disclosure of the asset, which 
has a negative impact on the competitive advantage of the company and may cause 
privacy issues, leading to legal consequences. Once the impact severity levels are defined 
for the organization, the information owners determine the severity of the impact for each 




Cost Estimation Software / 
Pricing Package 
Employee roles 
(those who have a special skill 
or knowledge that is difficult 
to replace, yet critical for the 
organization) 
Design Department Chief 
Cost Estimation Expert 
List special skills or 
knowledge 
Specific designs developed for 
special customers - large 
accounts 
Accuracy in project cost 
estimation and leverage of 
contingency, based on vast 
previous project experience 
Table 5-4: Resources and Skills 
Regardless of their type and use, all assets including those systems under development are 
in scope of the assessment. This is a recommended practice in the system development 
life-cycle. The security requirements of organization's critical information assets are 
distinguished between confidentiality, integrity or availability of an asset. The following 
tables present the security requirements of the assets discussed earlier: 
Input Assets 
Resume Bank 
References - client references 






















Table 5-5: Security Requirements for Inputs 
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Processing Assets 































Table 5-6: Security Requirements for Processing Assets 
Output Assets 
Technical Package - Response 
to Proposal 
























Table 5-7: Security Requirements for Outputs 
5.2.2 Evaluate Security Practices 
The identification of the critical information assets in the organization, performed in the 
first stage helps to scope the information risk assessment. We also want to understand the 
level of awareness in information security in the organization at this stage. In order to 
identify management knowledge and the operational level staff's knowledge, a good 
cross-section from each level is selected within the organization, for a workshop session 
facilitated by the information risk analysis team or simply a security survey is completed. 
The security practices survey is developed based on the best practices, standards, and 
structured methodologies, presented in Chapter 2. Best practices in information security 
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are updated on a periodic basis, with respect to the developments in the security practice 
area. The analysis team members are expected to prepare questions, by selecting the most 
appropriate security practices from the best practices that apply to the organization 
undergoing information risk assessment. 
The responses to the survey questions are used to assess the security knowledge of the 
members in the organization. In the next steps of the risk assessment, these findings are 
used as basis to recommend actions to reach the desired state of security for the 
organization. In the example below, samples from survey results are shown on the first 
set of questions in strategic security practice: "Security Awareness". The participants 
demonstrate their knowledge and awareness in implementing the security practice in the 
organization. The percentages are cumulative from 14 participants from the Design 
Department, 12 participants in Project Department, 5 participants from Finance 
Department, and 7 participants from IT Department. Full set of survey questions can be 
customized from the methodologies, best practices and guidelines, modified according to 
the organization's requirements. 
Security Practice Area Question 
Staff members understand their roles and 
responsibilities, regarding protection of assets. The 
roles and responsibilities are documented and 
verified. [9] 
There is expertise for all responsibilities of data 
custodian, within the organization, including their 
secure operation. This is documented and verified. [9] 
Cumulative Results from Respondents 
37.5% - Yes; 37. 5 % - Yes, but not 
effective; 25% - No; 0% - Don't know 
37.5% - Yes, 25.0% - Yes, but not 
effective, 12.5% - No, 25.0% - Don't 
know 
Table 5-8: Sample of Security Survey Results 
According to the cumulative responses from the participants, we determine the status for 
each security practice area amongst the levels presented in the methodology. 
no 
Security Practice Area Question 
Staff members understand their security roles and 
responsibilities. This is documented and verified. 
There is adequate in-house expertise for all 
supported services, mechanisms, and technologies 
(e.g., logging, monitoring, or encryption), 
including their secure operation. This is 
documented and verified. 
Status 
Yellow - The organization is 
performing the security practices to 
some extent; there is room for 
improvement. 
Yellow — The organization is 
performing the security practices to 
some extent; there is room for 
improvement. 
Table 5-9: Sample of Security Survey Results [6] 
5.2.3 Characterize Threats 
In this phase, the analysis team focuses on establishing the threat profile for each asset at 
risk. The threat and vulnerability analysis starts by consolidation of data collected on 
asset profiles. When consolidating data, it is important to represent the data as it was 
originally recorded. Information is grouped, conflicts are resolved, the information 
collected is validated with the respondents and the missing information is defined prior to 
characterize the threats. 
Prior to seeking out threats from the participants, it is important to explain them the threat 
factors, so that they can define the threats to their information, by reflecting on these 
factors. Each threat comprises specific properties, as explained in Chapter 4. All of 
these properties may not be characteristics of one threat. Depending on the threat 
scenario, only a subset may be applicable. The first factor to form a threat is the asset. 
Once the asset which is at risk is identified, the threat is described, by the actor, his or her 
motive, and access method. The outcome, leading to an asset's disclosure, modification, 
destruction, loss or interruption is identified. 
In the example, one of the critical assets of the Project Department; Resume Bank is 
taken into consideration, and analyzed against its pertaining threat scenarios. Human 
actors both inside the organization and outside the organization are considered to be a 
threat source. These actors can disturb the security of the asset, both by electronic access 
and by physical means. The motive of the actor can be assigned a value from "High" to 
"Low". High corresponds to "5" and the "Low" corresponds to " 1 " . The same exercise 
is repeated for all selected critical assets to have the complete list of threats. 
Department Name: Project Department 
Asset Name: Resume Bank 
Access Method 
Actor 
Motive / Motive Strength 
People inside the organization via 
physical access, acting accidentally (3) 
People inside the organization via 
physical access, acting accidentally (2) 
People outside the organization via 
physical access, acting deliberately (2) 
People outside the organization via 
electronic access, acting deliberately 
(2) 
People outside the organization via 








































Insiders disclosing resumes to third 
parties without authorization. 
Insiders acting accidentally: Typing 
errors impacts accuracy of resumes. 
Outsiders acting intentionally to 
access Resume Database, without 
authorization. 
Outsiders acting intentionally to 
access Resume Database, provided to 
others by the third parties, without 
authorization. 
Contractors being provided with 
access Resume Database. 
Threat Description 
Resume Database not being available 
for an undetermined time, as a result 
of fire. 
Resume Database not being available 
due to snow storm, during proposal 
preparation. 
Resume Database not being available 
due to an electricity interruption, 
during proposal preparation. 
Table 5-10: Threat Characterization 
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Based on the threat scenarios developed above, we review the incident history to 
understand if the listed threats have occurred and their frequency of occurrence. 
Incident History 
Twice in the past 10 years 






Once in the past three 
years 
Threat Descriptions 
Insiders disclosing resumes to third parties without 
authorization. 
Insiders acting accidentally: Typing error, using the wrong 
version of the resumes in response to proposals. 
Outsiders acting accidentally access Resume Database, without 
authorization. 
Outsiders acting intentionally to access Resume Database, 
providing information to the third parties, without authorization. 
Contractors being provided with access to Resume Database. 
Resume Database not being available for an undetermined 
period of time, as a result of fire. 
Resume Database not being available due to an electricity 
interruption, during proposal preparation. 
Table 5-11: Incident History 
5.2.4 Identify Vulnerabilities 
In this phase, the IT analysis team first determines network vulnerabilities for each critical 
asset identified. Following the network vulnerabilities, the physical threat and 
vulnerability assessment is conducted by assessing the current physical controls and areas 
of possible threat exposures. 
First we analyze, the infrastructure dependencies of each critical asset, such as: 
• servers in which the application and database reside; 
• their associated networking components, such as routers, switches, and modems; 
• their security components, like firewalls, desktop workstations, home computers 
of users, portable PC s, storage devices; and 
• wireless components, such as mobile phones where the information is 
communicated and stored. 
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Topology or other types of network maps may be used to review where critical assets 
reside and how they are accessed. Qualified and trained IT staff in the organization makes 
the analysis. The results are discussed with the business participants. We use the same 
example, "Resume Database" that is used in the previous phase, to examine its systems of 
interest, intermediate access points, systems accessed to reach to "Resume Database", and 
data storage locations. 
Systems of Interest 
Intermediate Access Points 
Systems Accessed 
Data Storage Locations 
File and Print Servers Resume Database resides on, Internal 
Networks, On-site workstations 
Internal Networks, Company website, External Networks 
On-site workstations, laptops, wireless devices, mobile 
phones, home computers, other external stations like client 
site computers 
Storage Devices, Back up tapes, alternative site 
Table 5-12: Dependencies of the Critical Asset 
Upon review of the other critical assets and their dependencies, we conclude that 
"Resume Database" is dependent on the key systems and are shared by other critical 
assets. Then, we determine who is responsible for the selected components to manage the 
change required, to manage their security and how well each class of component is 
currently being protected. This is done by determining the extent security when 
configuring and maintaining each class of components. When the responsibilities are 
assigned to IT administrators, it should be noted that the ultimate responsibility resides 
with the IT Department Head. 
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Component Classes 






















Not at All Don't Know 
Table 5-13: Review of Infrastructure 
Vulnerability analysis is performed similar to the threat analysis. Vulnerabilities are 
classified into categories, as in the threat analysis. Categories of vulnerabilities could be 
similar to that of the security practices, established for the organization in Chapter 3. 
Additional vulnerability information can also be acquired upon an environmental 
analysis, a system analysis or a technical analysis. A technical evaluation for 
vulnerability analysis is run for the selected infrastructure components. If these tools are 
not owned by the organization, the service can be contracted. The initial summary of the 
results are produced by those who conduct the analysis and discussed with the other 
participants. 
In the example below, part of the network vulnerabilities are displayed with their 
description into categories. The key components they impact technically are listed, with 


















Electronic Vulnerability Description 
Users do not ask authorization from the 
right individual, when they are requesting 
access to the Resume Database. Some 
users ask access for themselves. 
Within the same department, all users 
have access to the Resume Database 
Each department has different ways of 
delegating access to Resume Database, 
there is no single procedure followed. 
Information saved on local drives is easily 
accessible. Laptops are lost or stolen. 
Historic data in Resume Bank makes up 
70% of the data on thefde & print 
servers, taking up too much space. 
Resume Data is available in multiple 
locations and not specifically protected. 
Key component Category 
File and Print Server 
File and Print Server 
File and Print Server 
Workstations 
File and Print Server 
File and Print Server 
Table 5-14: Network Vulnerability Analysis 
The results from the vulnerability analysis are analyzed within an organized workshop 
and summaries for each critical asset are built. The results are then discussed and the 
vulnerabilities that require to be fixed are determined. 
Assess Physical Controls and Determine Physical Vulnerabilities: We have reviewed the 
control measures taken for physical security in the building, specifically in the computer 
room where the servers reside. We have identified and recorded the issues in the 











control to Computer 
Room 
Inadequate access 













Physical Vulnerability Description 
Entrance to the computer room is 
controlled by access card, however there 
is accompanying personnel without the 
access card who enters to the Computer 
Room, on an add-hoc basis. 
There is a camera for surveillance of 
entry to Computer room, yet there is no 
security staff assigned to watch it. 
Door alarms are functional in case of 
access without authorization, although 
this alarm is mixed with the false alarm 
when the door is left open for an 
exceeding amount of time. No attention is 
paid even if the door alarm signals. 
Unauthorized personnel can enter to the 
building. Laptops were lost and stolen. 
One of the UPS in the Computer Room is 
in service interruption, waiting for the 
technicians to be fixed. 
A/C in the computer room has low 
capacity to supply adequately, as there 
are fluctuations in the temperature. Due 
to an unexpected capacity increase in the 
infrastructure and the number of servers, 
an A/C system upgrade is required. 
There are visitors in the building without 
a visitor badge or another indication that 
they are visitors and are not always 
accompanied by authorized personnel. 
Key component Category 
Servers - Key 
Components as 
dependents of critical 
assets 
Servers - Key 
Components as 
dependents of critical 
assets 
Hard copy documents 
that are critical 
information assets 
residing in the office, 
Laptops. 
Laptops 
Servers — Key 
Components as 
dependents of critical 
assets 
Servers - Key 
Components as 
dependents of critical 
assets 
Hard copy documents 
that are critical 
information assets 
residing in the office, 
laptops. 
Table 5-15: Physical Vulnerability Analysis 
5.2.5 Analyze Risks 
In this phase, we determine and analyze the risks to the organization's information 
security. Risks are classified into categories and a risk matrix is used to present the risk 
portfolio, based on a scale of likelihood versus the impact of the risks to determine the 
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magnitude of the risk. With this view, high risk areas can be seen easily with respect to 
the medium and low risk areas. 
We first determine the likelihood and then the impact criteria for the organization. For 
each identified risk, two factors, its likelihood and impact are determined, in order to 
prioritize the information security risks. Likelihood rating of each risk is determined, 
based on to the following criteria established for the organization, by the participants and 






















Likely to occur in a monthly 
time period 
Likely to occur in a quarterly 
time period 
Likely to occur in a one year 
time period 
Likely to occur in a five year 
time period 





50 - 95% 
30 - 49% 
5 - 29% 
<5% 
Table 5-16: Likelihood Rating 
Upon determination of likelihood criteria, we focus on determining impact criteria for the 
organization. Then, statements of actual impact to the organization are defined for each 
threat outcome. The impact criteria defined for the organization must be uniform, 
throughout the information risk assessment. Thus, it is necessary to select the impact 
criteria either with the upper management or confirm it with them. 
Once impact criteria are established, they are used to assess all risks identified throughout 
the information risk assessment. This provides consistency. The impact severities are 
determined by the participants. The impact types can be tangible or intangible. The 
types are financial, strategic, operational and marketing impacts that impact the goals of 
the organization. The following impact criteria set is considered as the basis in 
determining impacts of threats to the organization's critical assets. 







Units of measure: Dollars 
Loss to the organization exceeds $50m 
Loss to the organization is between $20m and $50m 
Loss to the organization is between $5m and $20m 
Loss to the organization is between $Im and 5m 
Loss is less than $lm 
Table 5-17: Quantitative Measure of Financial Impact 







Units of measure: Strategic 
objectives met 
An inability to deliver most 
strategic objectives 
A major failing in the delivery of 
some strategic objectives 
A failing in one or two strategic 
objectives 
An inability to deliver some 
department objective 
No impact on organizational 
strategic objectives 
Units of measure: Publicity 
Government or other investigative business 
initiates a high-profde, in-depth investigation 
into business practices, accompanied with 
high criticism in the media 
Sustained criticism over three or four months 
in the media 
Government requests information, some 
national public or media criticism lasting a 
week 
A sideline in the local press 
A low level of interest in a particular activity 
Table 5-18: Qualitative Measure of Strategic, Legal, Publicity Impacts 
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Units of measure: Product 
delivery 
Inability to deliver key products 
for more than three months 
Inability to deliver key products 
for more than three weeks 
Inability to deliver key products 
more than three days 
Delivery of key products delayed 
for more than a day or less 
Minor issues with regard to 
relationships with suppliers 
Units of measure: Customer Service 
Delay in delivery costs above 5 % of the 
total revenue 
Delay in delivery costs above 3 % of the 
total revenue 
Delay in delivery costs I % of the total 
revenue 
Delay in delivery costs less than 1% of the 
total revenue 
Delay in delivery causes less than 0.1% of 
the total revenue 
Table 5-19: Qualitative Measure of Impact to the Customer 








Units of measure: Health, safety 
and environmental incidents 
Multiple major reportable events 
or a single catastrophic event 
Major reportable event 
Several reportable incidents 
One or two reportable incidents 
No reportable incidents 
Units of measure: Production hours lost 
Substantial loss of production capability -
more than three days of production hours 
Significant loss of production — up to one 
day of production hours 
Effect between 5% and 20% of day's 
production hours 
Effect less than 5% of day's production 
hours 
Minimal loss of production hours 
Table 5-20: Qualitative Measure of Health and Safety & Production Impacts 
Once likelihood and impact criteria are set, we analyze the risks that impact critical assets 
identified. In the example below, risks pertaining to the top three critical assets of the 
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organization are listed. The information is collected in a work-session from the 
workshop participants responsible for project execution, as well as proposal preparation. 
Asset 1 Risks 
Acrobat files must be adjusted prior to distribution of final pricing and technical 
package in bid response. Security of acrobat files is not considered, staff is not 
educated on the security features of acrobat reader files. (PI 1) 
Proposal 
Information 
Proposal preparations are done with minimum budget involve junior staff, 
which causes errors in various steps, including design calculation. (PI 2) 
During the proposal preparation stage, competitors try gaining access to the 
response information by their personal contacts. (PI 3) 
Proposal drafts are accessible to many staff members, during the preparation 
stage, which violates confidentiality. (PI 4) 
A significant number of staff from different departments is involved in 
preparation of proposals. (PI 5) 
Table 5-21: Asset 1 versus Risks 
Asset 2 Risks 
The applications used daily, for design not being available in a timely manner. 
(DD 6) 
Design drawings information is erased or lost. (DD 7) 
Design 
Drawings 
Archived designs are not available when required documentation must be 
created from scratch. (DD 8) 
Fire destroying hard copies of archived design drawings. (DD 9) 
Modification of drawings without authorization.(DD 10) 
Design inputs entered incorrectly or modified. (DD 11) 
Color codes on drawings being misinterpreted in acrobat reader copies.(DD 12) 
Table 5-22: Asset 2 versus Risks 
Asset 3 Risks 
Employees, contractors leaving work premises with paper or electronic copies 
of project information. (PP 13) 
Project 
Information 
Physical access to the main office not being adequately controlled. (PP 14) 
Procedures are present to protect access rights to project information, but they 
are not implemented and practices fully, although management assumes they are 
in practice. (PP 15) 
Project costs being disclosed to unauthorized parties, deliberately or 
accidentally. (PP 16) 
Archive project information being classified only at one location, which is 
vulnerable to physical threats. (PP 17) 
Information on project site not being available, timely when required. (PP 18) 
Confidential reports being disclosed to unauthorized third parties. (PP 19) 
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Not being able to access project information during life cycle of a project, due to 
inadequate classification organization. (PP 20) 
Design errors impacting project execution (PP 21) 
Documents easily accessible desks of personnel, offices, cabinets not locked 
clean desk policy not practiced. (PP 22) 
Individuals accumulating a lot of unnecessary information, fdling up the space 
in the project directories. (PP 23) 
Inadequate procedures for physical access control. (PP 24) 
Project information not being available, due to interruptions. (PP 25) 
Unauthorized parties entering to restricted areas. (PP 26) 
Temporary accesses to clients, partners, contractors not being controlled. (PP 
27) 
Contracts not being accessible when required for legal purposes. (PP 28) 
Clients disclosing project confidential information to third parties. (PP 29) 
Project costs being modified, by unauthorized access. (PP 30) 
Table 5-23: Asset 3 versus Risks 
We then define the impact criteria into five levels, similar to the likelihood grading, and 
we develop a risk matrix for the organization. We determine inherent risks by 
multiplying the likelihood with impact rating. Then, we determine if there are any 
established controls to minimize the risk. The control grading scale is as follows, 















Risk response is adequate to the threat 
Risk response is appropriate for the foreseeable results of the 
threat 
Risk response is appropriate for the threat but gaps have been 
identified that could result in unwelcome surprises / outcomes 
Risk response is inadequate and could readily lead to 
unwelcome surprises / outcomes under normal operating 
conditions 
Risk response does not reduce inherent risk rating. Risk before 
the control and after the control is the same. 
Table 5-24: Controls Rating 
The risks to the three assets are evaluated according to their likelihood and impact. Once 
the controls that are countermeasures are established, the risks are re-evaluated. These 
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are called inherent risks. The inherent risks are determined based on the level of impact 






































































































































































































































































Table 5-25: Risk Profile 
Results are validated through discussion with management. The results may be different 
than the perception prior to conducting the risk assessment. It is required to improve the 
awareness of staff and management in security for the results to be accepted and the 
action plan to be implemented. Change management and communication planning 
concepts are essential. In the management session, a graphical tool is used to understand 
the priorities of the above risks as a visual aid and a communication tool. The likelihood 
of a risk is recorded on the X and the impact on the Y axis. From their product, the risk 
is calculated. The high risk areas are shown in dark grey color, towards to the upper right 
hand of the graph. The colors change to lighter grey, as the risk levels decrease. The 
scale of five is used to measure and record the impact severity and likelihood of 
occurrence, based on the criteria defined in five levels previously. 
According to their likelihood and impacts noted in the above table, the residual risks 
listed are shown on a graph. In the graph, the high risks are demonstrated towards the top 
right corner of the graph, whereas the low risk areas are demonstrated towards the bottom 
left corner. All risks have to be reviewed in the management session, as it is possible that 
a risk could be rated higher or lower than what it is supposed to be. For example, a low 
risk may have been misjudged and actually it can be a medium to high risk, where 







1 2 3 4 
Likelihood 
Figure 5.2-2: Risk Profile 
5.3.6 Develop Security Strategy and Mitigation Plans 
The protection strategy defines the strategies that an organization uses to enable, initiate, 
implement and maintain its internal security. It is a long-term commitment and is 
organization-wide. The security protection strategy must include strategic and 
operational controls. Prior to establishing the security strategy, the analysis team 
reviews risks from the graphical presentation and the results from the previous steps, 
specifically those pertaining to the security practices survey conducted, in Phase 2. 
We conduct a gap analysis between the current security state and the target security state 
of the organization. The purpose of the gap analysis is to understand the magnitude of 
change to move from the current state of security within the organization to the desired 
future state; where the management wants to be at, within a given period of time in 
maturity of security. The magnitude of change (i.e. the gap between the current and 
future) drives the change management strategy for implementation stage of security 
practices and controls, in management of information security risks. The gap between 
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the two states requires a series of activity planning, projects to take the countermeasures 
necessary to bridge the gap and achieve the future state. 
In our study, the gap analysis is performed by comparing the present state of security to 
the information security best practices and guidelines established in ISO 17799 [40] as 
the basis of our security strategy and mitigation planning development. According to 
ISO 17799, security practices could be summarized in the areas of: 
• Security Policy; 
• Organizational Security Practice; 
• Asset Classification and Control; 
• Personnel Security; 
• Physical Environment Security; 
• Communications and Operations Management; 
• Access Control; 
• Systems Development and Maintenance; 
• Information Security Incidents; 
• Business Continuity Management; and 
• Compliance. 
Security policy covers policy definition and structure, maintenance of policy 
documentation. Organizational security practice area covers management support, 
information security roles and responsibilities, confidentiality agreements, external 
parties. Asset classification and control covers areas in responsibility for assets, 
information classification. Personnel security covers prior to the employment stage, 
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during employment and upon termination or leave. Physical environmental security looks 
into secure areas and equipment security. Communications and operations management 
covers areas in operational procedures and responsibilities, third party service delivery 
management, protection against malicious and mobile code, systems planning and 
acceptance, back-up, network security management, media handling, exchange of 
information, e-commerce services, monitoring. Access control covers business 
requirements for access control, user access management, user responsibilities, network 
access control, operating system access control, application and information access 
control, mobile computing tele-working. System development and maintenance covers 
security in development and support processes, correct processing in applications, 
technical vulnerability management, security requirements of information systems, 
cryptographic controls, security of system files. Information security incident 
management covers areas in reporting information security events and weaknesses, 
management of information security incidents and improvements. Business continuity 
management covers areas in information security aspects of business continuity 
management and disaster recovery planning. Compliance includes compliance with legal 
requirements, compliance with security policies and standards, information systems audit 
considerations. 
We provided recommendations on how to improve the present situation in security, based 
on the findings by giving priorities to the action items, categorized into short term 
actions; up to six months, mid term actions; between six months to a year, and long term 
security planning for the strategy; from one year to two years. 
In the table below, only the "Security Policy" area is taken into consideration for review. 
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With respect to the nature of the security practice, accountability resides with the IT 
Department Manager. Security policy and procedures must be followed by all personnel 
in the organization. Training and awareness sessions must be organized for the staff to 
learn more about the practices and implement them regularly. Collaborative issues must 
also be taken into account, as the organization works with third parties, contractors and 
clients during projects. Third parties must adhere to the security policy. This must be 
verified, by assigned security staff from the organization. 
With respect to the nature of the organization, the work environment necessitates 
working with clients and contractors during project life-cycles. In this case, the 
responsibility to adhere with the security policy is a combined responsibility that includes 
internal and external staff. 
Upon completing the protection strategy, through gap analysis, the analysis team presents 
the proposed protection strategy to the senior managers in the organization. The senior 
management then reviews and revises the strategy. The risk mitigation plans are 
developed for the risks identified, on an asset basis in Phase 5. The protection strategy 
developed with respect to each practice area defines the long, medium, or short-term 
actions. Risk mitigation plans need to be consistent with the protection strategy. While 
defining the action items, the responsible person, the expected completion date and 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5-27: Risk Mitigation Plans 
As a result, the following summary of mitigation planning activities is required, with 
respect to the security practice areas in scope. 
Security Practice Areas 
Security Policy 
Organizational Security Practice 
Asset Classification and Control 
Personnel Security 
Physical Environment Security 
Communications and Operations Management 
Access Control 
Systems Development and Maintenance 
Information Security Incidents 






Table 5-28: Risk Mitigation Plans 
A graphical representation is provided, by a bar chart to show the percentage of effort 
required for each security practice area where mitigation plan is required for the 
countermeasures against information security risks. 
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Figure 5.2-3: Graphical Representation of Mitigation Activities 
5.3 Conclusions 
In the case study presented, we demonstrated how an information risk assessment is 
conducted, following the principles and activities of the methodology proposed in 
Chapter 4. While all the present information risk assessment methodologies provide 
guidelines and worksheets, we have accompanied our methodology with a case study 
to validate the proposed methodology and to help the user better understand the 
process and ease the implementation efforts, which can be used for training purposes 
for the analysis team as well as for participants. Besides the demonstration of the 
activities in each phase, the principles emphasized in the methodology are used as 
building blocks in the case study. Information risk assessment sets the foundation of 
good information security management and is not a stand alone effort, therefore 
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organizational factors and its related principles are put in practice if a successful and 
effective information security program is desired. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Information security is emerging as one of the most important challenges both in 
private and public sectors and in academic research. Individuals, corporations and 
organizations are exposed to various security incidents that lead to consequences 
ranging from small interruption to the business to shut down of the business for a long 
period of time. Availability, integrity and confidentiality of the critical information to 
the organization must be secured at all times. 
Methodologies to manage information security risks are developing and ad-hoc 
information risk assessments are no longer adequate for the organizations. In this 
context, information risk assessment plays a major role by providing a structured 
methodology in detecting and effectively managing information security risks. 
Although, information risk assessment is considered a technical threat and vulnerability 
assessment in many organizations, it is extremely pertinent as a security tool now-a-
days more than ever, that serves to organization's strategic, operational goals and 
regulatory compliance. 
136 
Accordingly, there is a need to understand what information risk assessment involves, 
how it is structured, which one is more suitable for an organization and how it can be 
customized according to the organization's need undertaking the assessment so that it 
can be implemented effectively. A methodology incorporates dedicated processes, 
methodologies and techniques to assess information risks to the organization. Such a 
framework will help the organization and the analysis team who undertakes the task of 
conducting the information risk assessment. 
The contribution to this thesis is relative to the information risk assessment 
methodologies. In this respect, this thesis presents a detailed study of the state of the art 
processes. It also focuses on a comparative study of the existing information risk 
assessment methodologies. With a deep understanding of the potentials, and pitfalls in 
implementation, a proposal is provided for a new methodology that may leverage the 
major features of existing methodologies and may fix their identified shortcomings. In 
addition, the information risk assessment process provides new features which can be 
summarized as follows in principles: 
• Iterativeness and Validation; 
• Computer Support; 
• Documentation; 
• Quality Assurance; 
• Change Management; 
• Communications Planning; 
• Supply Chain Management; 
• Knowledge Transfer; and 
• Performance Management and Continuous Improvement. 
According to these principles, following phases which propose a set of activities are 
created to guide the user in implementation of the methodology: 
• Identify and Scope; 
• Evaluate Security Practices; 
• Characterize Threats; 
• Identify Vulnerabilities; 
• Analyze Risks; and 
• Develop Security Strategy and Mitigation Plans. 
The implementation of the proposed methodology is demonstrated in a case study with 
customization according to the organization's needs, as part of a basic requirement in 
an implementation of a risk assessment. This exercise follows the steps developed in 
the proposed methodology with practical insights and useful abstractions that may help 
those undertaking information risk assessment, its research, development and 
organizational implementation. 
As future work, multiple case studies can be conducted in the same industry. This 
serves as common knowledge base for a certain industry and helps to define the typical 
types of threats, historical data on threats, common risks for that industry and effective 
security strategies and countermeasures that are applied in that industry. 
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